Abstract
In [Maschler and Owen, 1989], a new generalization of the Shapley value for a class of NTU games was introduced. The motivation was a desire to preserve as much as possible the consistency property of the Shapley value for TU games, in the sense of [Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989]. It turned out that the new value resulted from an intuitive dynamic process which was interesting also for the class of TU games. Unfortunately, the class of NTU games was quite narrow; namely, the class of hyperplane games. The purpose of this paper is to extend the definition to the general class of NTU games, whose coalition functions satisfy (essentially) the usual requirements.
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References
Hart, S., An Axiomatization of Harsanyi’s Non-Transferable Utility Solution, Econometrics. 53 (1985), 1295–1313.
Hart, S., and A. Mas-Colell, Potential, Value and Consistency, Econometrica 57 (1989), 589–614.
Maschler, M., and G. Owen, The Consistent Shapley Value for Hyperplane Games, International Journal of Game Theory 18 (1989), 389–407.
Maschler, M., G. Owen, and B. Peleg, Paths Leading to the Nash Set, in “The Shapley Value, Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley,” A. E. Roth, ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge—New York—New Rochelle—Melbourne—Sydney, 1988, pp. 321–330.
Shapley, L. S., Utility Comparison and the Theory of Games,in “La Décision: Aggrégation et Dynamique des Ordres de Preférénce,” Edition du CNRS, Paris, 1969, pp. 251–263;2 also, in “The Shapley Value, Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley,” A. E. Roth. ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge-New York-New Rochelle-Melbourne-Sydney, 1988. pp. 307–319.
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© 1992 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Maschler, M., Owen, G. (1992). The Consistent Shapley Value for Games without Side Payments. In: Selten, R. (eds) Rational Interaction. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-09664-2_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-09664-2_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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