Collaborative Planning in Supply Chains pp 131-164 | Cite as

# Implications on Supply Contracts and Partner Incentives

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## Abstract

Chapters 4 and 5 describe the negotiation-based scheme for collaborative planning developed here. Thereby the emphasis is laid on conceptual and algorithmic aspects of the coordination mechanism. However, as collaborative planning affects the cost outcomes of involved SC partners, issues relating to the financial flow between the partners need to be considered as well. In particular, the objective is to adapt payments between the parties in such a way that all partners benefit from collaborative planning and hence have an incentive to cooperate with their SC partners. This is dealt with in the following section.

## Keywords

Cost Increase Order Quantity Opportunistic Behavior Cost Effect Negotiation Scheme## Preview

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## References

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