Collaborative Planning in Supply Chains pp 55-101 | Cite as

# Negotiation-Based Collaborative Planning Between two Partners

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## Abstract

In this chapter we develop a collaborative planning scheme for a single buyer-supplier pair. The underlying idea is to formalize a negotiation-like, iterative process between the supplier and buyer. Order proposals (generated by the buyer) and supply proposals (generated by the supplier) are passed between the parties in an iterative manner. A proposal received from the partner is analyzed for its consequences on local planning, and a counter-proposal is generated by introducing partial modifications. Resulting is a negotiation-based process which subsequently improves supply chain wide costs without centralized decision making and with limited exchange of information. MPM as introduced in section 3.1 are used throughout all stages of the process.

## Keywords

Goal Programming Order Quantity Compromise Solution Acceptance Function Collaborative Planning## Preview

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## References

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