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A Quantum Theory of the Mind-Brain Interface

  • Henry P. Stapp
Part of the The Frontiers Collection book series (FRONTCOLL)

Abstract

Advances in science often unify conceptually things previously thought to be unconnected. Thus Newtonian mechanics unified our understanding of stellar and terrestial motions, and Maxwell’s theory unified our understanding of electromagnetic phenomena and light. Einstein’s special theory of relativity unified our concepts of space and time, and his general theory unified our conceptions of spacetime and gravity. My thesis here is that the integration of consciousness into science requires considering together two outstanding fundamental problems in contemporary science, namely the problem of the connection between mind and brain, and the problem of measurement in quantum theory.

Keywords

Quantum Theory Actual Event Classical Physic Brain Process Essential Unity 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Henry P. Stapp
    • 1
  1. 1.Lawrence Berkeley LaboratoryBerkeleyUSA

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