Revisiting “The Nobel Lie”: An Argument for Constitutional Constraints

Abstract

For the public sector to function at all, there must be some degree of public trust in its ability to function and achieve the goals for which it was established. As early as the 1700s Benjamin Franklin pointed out that “Much of the strength and efficiency of any government, in procuring & securing happiness to the people, depends on ... the general opinion of the goodness of that government.”¹ In 1988 Buchanan and Brennan argued that the basic public choice premise that government action is motivated primarily by private interest, might well serve to undermine public trust in government and reduce its effectiveness. In concluding their argument they posed a key question, “Is public choice immoral?” and responded that (1988, p. 184):

Even if the explanatory power of public choice models of politics is acknowledged, the moral spillovers of such models on the behavior of political actors may be deemed to be so important as to negate any purely “scientific” advance made in our understanding of how politics actually works. The maintenance of the standards of public life, it could be argued, may require a heroic vision of the “statesman” or “public servant,” because only by holding such a vision can the possibility of public-interested behavior on the part of political agents be increased.