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Ethics, Corporate Culture and Economic Modelling

  • Lorenzo Sacconi
Chapter
  • 197 Downloads
Part of the Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy book series (SEEP)

Abstract

A well known result in the economic theory (Coase 1960) states that, when exclusive property rights are settled, and transaction costs (i. e. the costs related to the negotiation and enforcement of contracts and property rights) are equal to zero, then the market — market of rights, not only of goods — is always able to internalise all the costs, obtaining socially efficient outcomes. As it often happens, the most interesting implication of this finding is represented by its negative complement. In other words, it suggests considering what happens when transaction costs are not equal to zero. In this case, in fact, property rights have to be optimally designed and — if necessary — enforced by means of an authority or a public choice mecha nism, as they cannot be optimally transferred through costly market ex changes. Optimal designing of economic institutions and, in particular, of property rights are therefore a crucial task in the context of real economies, where transaction costs are effective.

Keywords

Business Ethic Social Contract Ethical Code Corporate Culture Specific Investment 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

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  • Lorenzo Sacconi

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