Abstract
The Kyoto Protocol contains several means for addressing non-compliance and enforcement of its obligations. None of them is particularly innovative and much will depend on subsequent elaboration by the COP/MOP. This is in line with the process-oriented character of the climate regime, i.e. its potential to develop and evolve over time.1 The basis for determining non-compliance is the system of national communications and the review procedure for those reports contained in Articles 7 and 8 of the Protocol, which will be based upon methodologies for the emission inventories to be elaborated under Article 5 of the Protocol.
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References
See “Protection of the Atmosphere: Statement of the International Meeting of Legal and Policy Experts, 20–22 February 1988, Ottawa”; reprinted in: The American University Journal of International Law and Policy, No. 5 (1990), pp.539–542.
On enforcement non-compliance in international environmental law in general see Ehrmann 1999.
The terminology of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (USA v. Iran), ICJ Rep. 1980, pp. 3, 40, 43.
See Ott 1998a; Gehring 1990; Koskenniemi 1992.
For its history see Ott 1991; Barratt-Brown 1991.
See Széll 1995, pp. 104 et seq. In other cases no formal procedure has been elaborated, but practice has developed like in the framework of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora of 1973, see Sand 1997.
See e.g. Chayes/Handler Chayes 1993 and Handler Chayes et al. 1995; for an application to the climate regime see Werksman 1998b.
Similarly, see the the submission of the UK in FCCC/AG13/1996/Misc.2.
See Széll 1995; Ott 1998a, pp. 215 et seq.; Victor et al. 1998.
This may be the most effective means of conflict resolution, see Sohn 1983, p. 1121–1146, p. 1122.
For an elaboration of this function see Ott 1998a, pp. 273 et seq.
Whereas the Republic of Cuba expressly declared that, in relation to Articlel4 FCCC, disputes should be settled by way of diplomatic negotiations, see FCCC/CP/1998Mf.5, Declarations 9 and 11.
The compulsory or mandatory character of the dispute resolution was a contentious issue in the negotiations of the Convention, see Bodansky 1993, p. 549.
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© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Oberthür, S., Ott, H.E. (1999). Implementation Review and Compliance (Articles 5, 7, 8, 16, 18, 19). In: The Kyoto Protocol. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03925-0_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03925-0_16
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