Simulating Cooperation and Competition: Present State and Future Objectives

  • Ramzi Suleiman
Conference paper


One hardly needs to argue that cooperation and competition constitute major components of most social interactions. Not surprisingly, then, that the study of these behaviors has occupied many scientists from the fields of biology, economy, sociology, political science, psychology and other disciplines of the behavioral sciences. Whereas no claim is made here in favor of any single approach, I argue that the application of game theory for studying minimal situations of cooperation and competition has proven quite beneficial.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ramzi Suleiman
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PsychologyUniversity of HaifaHaifaIsrael

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