Abstract
In contrast to global or international environmental systems, regional media relate to the spatial subsystems of a nation such as river systems, groundwater systems, or air regions. Regional media may also cut across national political boundaries, as occurs in the upper Rhine Valley where France, Germany, and Switzerland are linked. In this chapter we present a spatial-allocation model for a two-region system where pollutants are transmitted via environmental media from one region to another. The implications of the allocation model are derived and explained. The basic result is that emission taxes have to be differentiated according to regional conditions. The institutional problem of whether environmental allocation should be undertaken by national or regional authorities is discussed. Finally, we look into some practical problems such as interregional equity requirements and the relationship between regional environmental policy and regional planning.
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Notes
For a survey of the problem, compare Siebert (1979b, 1979d, 1985).
We here analyze a static allocation problem and neglect that pollutants accumulate over time. Compare chapter 12 and for the regional context Gebauer (1982).
We are only interested in inner solutions with S~, S2! O. Formally, no-negativity constraints could be additionally introduced into the maximization problem of Appendix 12A.
Compare the Tiebout theorem (1956).
Introducing an additional restraint for instance by a reduction of grants from the federal government could transform the non-cooperative game into a cooperative game.
Interregional spillovers may be of an intertemporal nature. Pollutants transported into a region may accumulate there over time. The problem then has to be analyzed as a cooperative or non-cooperative differential game which shows the properties of a steady-state in a two-region system and the time paths of pollution in both regions towards the steady state (Gebauer 1982 ).
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© 1992 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Siebert, H. (1992). Regional Aspects of Environmental Allocation. In: Economics of the Environment. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-02842-1_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-02842-1_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-662-02844-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-02842-1
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