Abstract
Fishery resource management is an intrinsically dynamic problem where current harvest decisions affect the possibilities of harvesting in the future. Moreover, in the case of two or more harvesting agents, the harvesters face a complicated dynamic game problem the solution of which depends on the behavioural strategies adopted (cooperative or non-cooperative management, myopic or foresighted optimization etc). Decision making in such an environment means negotiations and bargaining on the management strategies as well as on the planning horizon considered. These questions will be discussed in Section 2. In Section 3 we will illustrate problems which are related to the practical negotiation policies in international fishery management.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Cao, X.R., Preference functions and bargaining solutions, Proceedings of the 21st IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, Vol. 1, pp. 164–171, Orlando, Fa., 1982.
Clark, C.W., Mathematical Bioeconomics: The Optimal Management of Renewable Resources. New York, Wiley-Interscience, 1976.
Clark, C.W., Restricted access to common-property fishery resources: A game theoretic analysis. In: P.Liu (ed.), Dynamic Optimization and Mathematical Economics, New York, Plenum Press, pp. 117–132, 1980.
Fischer, T.R., An hierarchical game approach to fishery resource management, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Vol. SMC-11, pp. 216–222, 1981.
Halkin, H., Necessary conditions for optimal control problems with infinite horizon, Econometrica, Vol. 42, pp. 267–273, 1974.
Hämäläinen, R.P., Haurie, A. and Kaitala, V., Equilibria and threats in a fishery management game, Helsinki University of Technology, Systems Research Report A3, 1983. Accepted for publication in Optimal Control Applications & Methods.
Hämäläinen, R.P., Haurie, A. and Kaitala, V., Bargaining on whales: A differential game model with Pareto optimal equilibria, Operations Research Letters, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 5–11, 1984.
Hämäläinen, R.P. and Kaitala, V., A game on the choice of policy variables in a dynamic resource management game. Proceedings of the 21st IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, Vol. 1, pp. 181–185, Orlando, Fa., 1982.
Hämäläinen, R.P., Ruusunen, J. and Kaitala, V., Myopic Stackelberg equilibria and social coordination in a share contract fishery. Helsinki University of Technology, Systems Research Report A9, May 1984.
Hämäläinen, R.P., Ruusunen, J. and Kaitala, V., Cartels and dynamic contracts in sharefishing. Helsinki University of Technology, Systems Research Report A10, May 1984.
Haurie, A., A note on nonzero-sum differential games with bargaining solution, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol. 18, pp. 31–39, 1976.
Haurie, A. and Leitmann, G., On the global asymptotic stability of equilibrium solutions for open-loop differential games, to appear in Large Scale Systems.
Haurie, A. and Tolwinski, B., Acceptable equilibria in dynamic bargaining games, in Drenic, R.F. and Kozin, F. (eds.), System Modelling and Optimization, Proceedings of the 10th IFIP Conference, New York, September 1981.
Kaitala, V. and Hämäläinen, R.P., A differential game model of the non-cooperative management of an international fishery. Proceedings of the First International Conference Applied Modelling and Simulation, Life, men and societies, V.l. V, pp. 183–186, Lyon, France, September 7–11, 1981.
Kaitala, V., Hämäläinen, R.P. and Ruusunen, J., On the analysis of equilibria and bargaining in a fishery game. To appear in: G. Feichtinger (ed.), Economic Application of Control Theory, Proceedings of the Second Viennese Workshop, May 1984, North-Holland.
Kalai, E. and Smorodinsky, M., Other solutions to Nash’s bargaining problem, Econometrica, Vol. 43, pp. 513–518, 1975.
The Law of the Sea. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with Index and Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference of the Law of the Sea. UN, New York (USA), 262 pp., 1983.
Levhari, D. and Mirman, L.J., The great fish war: An example using a dynamic Cournot-Nash solution, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 322–334, 1980.
Mirman, L.J. and Spulber, D.F. (eds.), Essays in the Economics of Renewable Resources, Amsterdam, New York, Oxford, North-Holland, 1982.
Munro, G.R., The optimal management of transboundary renewable resources, Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 12, pp. 355–376, 1979.
Nash, J., The bargaining problem, Econometrica, Vol. 18, pp. 155–162, 1950.
Roth, A.E., Axiomatic Models of Bargaining, Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 1979.
Sethi, S.P. and Thompson, G.L., Optimal Control Theory: Applications to Management Science, Martinus Nijhoff Publishing, Boston, 1981.
Tolwinski, B., A concept of cooperative equilibrium for dynamic games, Automatica, Vol. 18, pp. 431–447, 1982.
Vincent, T.L., Vulnerability of a prey-predator model under harvesting, in Vincent, T.L. and Skowronski, J.M. (eds.), Renewable Resource Management, New York, Springer-Verlag, pp. 112–132, 1980.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1985 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Kaitala, V., Hämäläinen, R. (1985). On the Role of Dynamics and Information in International Negotiations: The Case of Fishery Management. In: Grauer, M., Thompson, M., Wierzbicki, A.P. (eds) Plural Rationality and Interactive Decision Processes. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 248. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-02432-4_15
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-02432-4_15
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-15675-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-02432-4
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive