Skip to main content

Regulierungsregime in Theorie und Praxis

  • Chapter
  • 172 Accesses

Zusammenfassung

Noch vor 20 Jahren wurde die Regulierung von marktmächtigen natürlichen Monopolen als command and control-Aufgabe verstanden. Wesentlicher Bestandteil einer solchen Strategie ist die Ausübung eines unmittelbaren Einflusses auf unternehmerische Entscheidungen, der mit Hilfe von Genehmigungen und Sanktionen durchgesetzt wird (vgl. z.B. Baldwin/Cave, 1999, S. 34–39). So verwundert es nicht, dass viele Veröffentlichungen auf der Suche nach einem Referenzmaßstab für eine optimale Regulierung die Ableitung von optimalen Tarifen in den Vordergrund stellen, deren Implementierungsmöglichkeiten jedoch selten hinterfragt wurden.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-00770-9_4
  • Chapter length: 35 pages
  • Instant PDF download
  • Readable on all devices
  • Own it forever
  • Exclusive offer for individuals only
  • Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout
eBook
USD   54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • ISBN: 978-3-662-00770-9
  • Instant PDF download
  • Readable on all devices
  • Own it forever
  • Exclusive offer for individuals only
  • Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Literaturverzeichnis

  • ACCC (1999): Application to Pass Through the Price Cap the Costs of a Multi-User Integrated Airport Terminal at Adelaide Airport, Draft Decision, May 1999, Melbourne: Australian Competition & Consumer Commission.

    Google Scholar 

  • Acton, J./Vogelsang, I. (1989): Introduction to the Symposium on Price Cap-Regulation, Rand Journal of Economics, 20(3), S. 369–372.

    Google Scholar 

  • Al, Ch./Sappington, D. (1998): The Impact of State Incentive Regulation On the U.S. Telecommunications Industry, University of Florida, Department of Economics Working Paper (http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/sappington/iir.html).

    Google Scholar 

  • Averch, H./Johnson, L. (1962): Behaviour of the firm under regulatory constraint, Amercian Economic Review, 52, S. 1052–1069.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bailey, E./Coleman, R. (1971): The Effect of Lagged Regulation in an Averch-Johnson Model, Bell Journal of Economics, 2, S. 278–292.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Baldwin, R./Cave, M. (1999): Understanding Regulation — Theory, Strategy, and Practice, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baron, D. (1991): Information, Incentives, and Commitment in Regulatory Mechanisms: Regulatory Innovation in Telecommunications, in: EINHORN, M. (Hrsg.), Price Caps and Incentive Regulation in Telecommunications, Boston et al.: Kluwer Academic Publishers, S. 47–75.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Baumol, W./Willig, R. (1989): Price Caps: A Rational Means to Protect Telecommunications Consumers and Competition, Review of Business, Spring 1989, S. 3–8.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernstein, J./Sappington, D. (1998a): Setting the X Factor in Price Cap Regulation Plans, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 6622 (http://papers.nber.org/papers/W6622.pdf).

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernstein, J./Sappington, D. (1998b): How to Determine the X in RPI-X Regulation: A User’s Guide, University of Florida, Department of Economics Working Paper (http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/sappington/papers/Ripx.pdf).

    Google Scholar 

  • Besanko, D./Spulber, D. (1992): Sequential-equilibrium investment by regulated firms, Rand Journal of Economics, 23(2), S. 153–170.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Blackmon, G. (1994): Incentive Regulation and the Regulation of Incentives, Boston et al.: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Borrmann, J./Finsinger, J. (1999): Markt und Regulierung, München: Verlag Franz Vahlen.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bös, D. (1986): Pricing and Price Regulation — An Economic Theory for Public Enterprises and Public Utilities, Advanced Textbooks in Economics, 34, North-Holland: Elsevier.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bös, D. (1993): Notes on Price-Cap Regulation, Discussion Paper A-278, Universität Bonn: Sonderforschungsbereich 303 der DFG.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bös, D. (1999): Incomplete contracting and price regulation, Journal of Public Economics, 73, S. 353–371.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Bradley, I./Price, C. (1988): The Economic Regulation of Private Industries by Price Constraints, Journal of Industrial Economics, XXXVII(1), S. 99–106.

    Google Scholar 

  • Braeutigam, R./Magura, M./Panzar, J. (1997): The Effects of Incentive Regulation on U.S. Local Telephone Rates, Chicago: Northwestern University mimeo.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brown, S./Sibley, D. (1986): The theory ofpublic utility pricing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burns, P. (1996): Natural Monopoly Regulation, CRI Technical Paper No 4, London: Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burns, P./Turvey, R./Weyman-Jones, T. (1995a): Sliding Scale Regulation of Monopoly Enterprises, CRI Discussion Paper No. 11, London: Centre for the Studies of Regulated Industries.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burns, P./Turvey, R./Weyman-Jones, T. (1995b): General properties of sliding scale regulation, CRI Technical Paper No. 3, London: Centre for the Studies of Regulated Industries.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bussing, I. (1936): Public Utility Regulation and the so-called Sliding Scale, New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chadwick, E. (1858): Results of Different Principles of Legislation in Europe, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, series A 22.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cowan, S. (1997a): Price-Cap Regulation and Inefficiency in Relative Pricing, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 12, S. 53–70.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Cowan, S. (1997b): Tight Average Revenue Regulation Can Be Worse Than No Regulation, Journal of Industrial Economics, XLV(1), S. 75–88.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cowan, S. (1998): Welfare Consequences of Tight Price-Cap Regulation, Bulletin of Economic Research, 50(2), S. 105–116.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Demsetz, H. (1968): Why Regulate Utilities, Journal of Law and Economics, 11, S. 55–65.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Doyle, C. (1993): Regulating Firms with Monopoly Power, in: Sudgen, R. (Hrsg.), Industrial Economic Regulation — A framework and exploration, London, New York: Routledge, S. 111–140.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • DTE (1999): Price cap regulation in the Electricity Sector — Information and Consultation Document, Den Haag: Dutch Electricity Regulatory Service (http://www.dte.nl/english/default.htm).

  • FCC (1997): In the Matter of Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, Access Charge Reform CC Docket No. 94–1, CC Docket No. 96–262, Relase Number FCC 97–159, Washington (DC): Federal Communications Commission.

    Google Scholar 

  • Green, R. (1997): Has Price Cap Regulation of U.K. Utilities Been a Success?, Public Policy For The Private Sector Note No. 132, Washington: World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/notes/notelist.html).

    Google Scholar 

  • Greenstein, S./Mcmaster, S./Spiller, P. (1995): The Effect of Incentive Regulation on Infrastructure Modernization: Local Exchange Companies’ Deployment of Digital Technology, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 4(2), S. 187–236.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Helm, D./Thompson, D. (1991): Privatised Transport Infrastructure and Incentives to Invest, Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 25(3), S. 231–246.

    Google Scholar 

  • IPART (1999): Regulation of Electricity Network Service Providers — Incentives and Principles for Regulation, Discussion Paper No 32, Sydney: Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of New South Wales.

    Google Scholar 

  • Joskow, P./Schmalensee, R. (1986): Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities, Yale Journal on Regulation, 4, S. 1–49.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahn, A. (1971): The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions, Vols. 1 and 2, New York: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kay, J. (1996): Measuring Profits for Sliding Scale and Equitable Sharing, in: Vass, P. (Hrsg.), Price Caps and Profit Sharing: A Policy Review, Proceedings of a CRI Seminar held in London on 13 September 1995, London: Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries (CRI)/CIPFA, S. 113–125.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kay, J./Vickers, J. (1988): Regulatory reform in Britain, Economic Policy, S. 286–31.

    Google Scholar 

  • Klein, M. (1998): Rebidding for Concessions, Public Policy for the Private Sector Note No. 161, New York: World Bank Group.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Knieps, G. (1997): Phasing Out Sector-Specific Regulation in Competitive Telecommunications, Kyklos, 50(3), S. 325–339.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Kridel, D./Sappington, D./Weisman, D. (1996): The Effects of Incentive Regulation in the Telecommunications Industry, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 9(3), S. 269–306.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Kunz, M. (1999): Airport Regulation — The Policy Framework, in: Pfähler, W./Niemeier, H.-M./Mayer, O. (Hrsg.), Airports and Air Traffic, Frankfurt et al.: Peter Lang, S. 11–55.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kwoka, J. (1991): Productivity and Price Caps in Telecommunications, in: Einhorn, M. (Hrsg.), Price Caps and Incentive Regulation in Telecommunications, Boston et al.: Kluwer Academic Publishers, S. 77–93.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Laffont, J.-J. (1994): The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After, Econometrica, 62(3), S. 507–537.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Laffont, J.-J./Tirole, J. (1993): A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, Cambridge (Mass.) und London: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Law, P. (1995): Tighter average revenue regulation can reduce consumer welfare, Journal of Industrial Economics, 18(4), S. 399–404.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lawrence, D. (1998): Benchmarking infrastructure enterprises, in: ACCC/PURC (Hrsg.), Infrastructure regulation and market reform, Melbourne: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and Public Utility Research Centre (Univ. of Florida), S. 54–66.

    Google Scholar 

  • Littlechild, S. (1983): Regulation of British Telecommunications’ Profitability, Report to the Secretary of State, London: Department of Industry.

    Google Scholar 

  • Loeb, M./Magat, W. (1979): A Decentralized Method of Utility Regulation, Journal of Law and Economics, 22, S. 99–404.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • London Economics (1999): Efficiency and benchmarking study of the NSW distribution business, Consultation paper von London Economics im Auftrag des Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART), New South Wales (Australien) (download via http://www.ipart.nsw.gov.au).

    Google Scholar 

  • Majumdar, S. (1996): Regulation and Productive Efficiency: Evidence from the U.S. Telecoummunications Industry, Paper presented at the Eleventh IST Biennial Conference, June 16–19, 1996, Sevilla.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayer, C./Nickers, J. (1996): Profit-Sharing: An Economic Appraisal, Fiscal Studies, 17(3), S. 1–18.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Ofgem (1999): Monitoring Transco’s Capital Expenditure — A Report and Consultation Document, London: The Office of Gas and Electricity Markets.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ofwat (1997): Tariff rebalancing and the tariff basket — A consultation paper, 1999 Periodical Review, London: Office of Water Services.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ofwat (1999): Future water and sewerage charges 2000–05, 1999 Periodical Review — Final Determinations, London: Office of Water Services.

    Google Scholar 

  • O’neill, D./Vass, P. (1996): Incentive Regulation: A Theoretical and Historical Review, Research Report 5, London: Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries.

    Google Scholar 

  • Panzar, J. (1999): Incentive Regulation in the US telecommunciations industry, Conference Proceedings of the 1999 Industry Economics Conference held by the Productivity Commission in conjunction with Monash University on 12/13 March 1999 (http://www.pc.gov.au/pcpubs/confproc/iec1999/chapterl.pdf).

    Google Scholar 

  • PSA (1994): Price capping: design and implementation issues, Discussion Paper No. 5, Melbourne: Price Surveillance Association.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rogerson, W. (1992): Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem, Review of Economic Studies, 59, S. 777–794.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Sappington, D. (1980): Strategic firm behavior under a dynamic regulatory adjustment process, Bell Journal of Economics, 11, S. 360–72.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Sappington, D./Sibley, D. (1992): Strategic nonlinear pricing under price-cap regulation, Rand Journal of Economics, 23(1), S.1–19.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Sappington, D./Weisman, D. (1996): Potential Pitfalls in Empirical Investigations of the Effects of Incentive Regulation Plans in the Telecommunications Industry, Information Economics and Policy, 8(2), S. 125–140.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Shepherd, W. (1992): Regulation and Efficiency: a Re-appraisal of Research and Policies, National Regulatory Research Institute (NRRI) Working Paper 92–14, Ohio State University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sherman, R. (1989): The regulation of monopoly, Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Shleifer, A. (1985): A theory of yardstick competition, Rand Journal of Economics, 16(3), S. 319–327.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Starkie, D. (1999): Airport Regulation 1997–98, in: VASS, P. (Hrsg.), Regulatory Review 1998/99, Bath: Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries (CRI), S. 7–17.

    Google Scholar 

  • Turvey, R. (1995): The Sliding Scale: Price and Dividend Regulation in the Nineteenth Century Gas Industry, London: National Economics Research Associates (n/e/r/a) Topics No. 16.

    Google Scholar 

  • Turvey, R. (1996): Sliding Scale Price Caps, in: Vass, P. (Hrsg.), Price Caps and Profit Sharing: A Policy Review, Proceedings of a CRI Seminar held in London on 13 September 1995, London: Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries (CRI)/CIPFA, S. 3–7.

    Google Scholar 

  • URF (1999): Best practice utility regulation, Utility Regulators Forum Discussion Paper prepared by the Office of Water Regulation, Perth, Australia (URL XXX).

    Google Scholar 

  • Vass, P. (Hrsg.) (1996): Price Caps and Profit Sharing: A Policy Review, Proceedings of a CRI Seminar held in London on 13 September 1995, London: Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries (CRI)/CIPFA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vass, P. (1997): The Methodology for Resetting X, in: Vass, P. (Hrsg.), Regulatory Review 1997, London: Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries (CRI)/CIPFA, S. 159–85.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vass, P. (1999): Accounting for Regulation, in: Regulatory Review 1998/99, Bath: Centre for the Studies of Regulated Industries, S. 231–252.

    Google Scholar 

  • Viehoff, I. (1995): Evaluating RPI-X, London: National Economics Research Associates (n/e/r/a) Topics No. 17.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vogelsang, I. (1988): Price Cap Regulation of Telecommunications Services: A Long-Run Approach, in: CREW, M. (Hrsg.), Deregulation and diversification of utilities, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, S. 21–42.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vogelsang, I. (1990): Optional two-part tariffs constrained by price caps, Economics Letters, 33(3), S. 287–292.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Vogelsang, I. (1991): A Non-Bayesian Incentive Mechanism Using Two-Part Tariffs, in: Einhorn, M. (Hrsg.), Price Caps and Incentive Regulation in Telecommunications, Boston et al.: Kluwer Academic Publishers, S. 15–31.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Vogelsang, I. (1998): Optimal Price Regulation for Natural and Legal Monopolies, Paper Prepared for CIDE Seminar on the Structural Reform and Regulation in the Energy Sector (http://www.cre.gob.mx/english/publications/researchindx.html).

    Google Scholar 

  • Vogelsang, I./Finsinger, J. (1979): A regulatory adjustment process for optimal pricing by multiproduct monopoly firms, Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), S. 157–70.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Waterson, M. (1993): Allocative Inefficiency and Monopoly as a Basis for Regulation, in: Sudgen, R. (Hrsg.) Industrial Economic Regulation — A framework and exploration, London/New York: Routledge, S. 29–43.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Waterson, M. (1995): Developing Utility Regulation in the UK, in: Helm, D. (Hrsg.), British Utility Regulation — Principles, Experience and Reform, Oxford: Oxera Press, S. 131–150.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, O. (1976): Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies: In General and with Respect to CATV, Bell Journal of Economics, 7 , S. 73–104.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, O. (1985): The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: The Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Willig, R.D. (1978): Pareto-Superior Nonlinear Outlay Schedules, Bell Journal of Economics, 9, S. 56–69.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

Copyright information

© 2000 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Kunz, M. (2000). Regulierungsregime in Theorie und Praxis. In: Knieps, G., Brunekreeft, G. (eds) Zwischen Regulierung und Wettbewerb. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-00770-9_4

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-00770-9_4

  • Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-1318-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-00770-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive