1 Introduction

Too often, the catchphrase “systemic corruption” leads to political and normative statements usually expressing its strict rejection and blaming the actors engaging in it. But despite decades of fighting systemic corruption, the world map of corruption is still red to dark red in many countries. We can keep complaining how bad this is. Scientists, and activists are telling us a lot about the negative consequences of systemic corruption. And we do not deny the negative consequences. But aren’t there any positive consequences, and not only for those who enrich themselves personally in a criminal way? As sociologists, however, we are used to ask ourselves also the other way around. If systemic corruption is so long lasting, what is the productivity, indeed functionality, of systemic corruption for a given society?

Leys raised this question as early as 1965, pointing out that most authors—as is still the case today—deal only with the bad consequences of systemic corruption without having examined all the consequences—both the good and the bad—in greater detail (Leys, 1965; De Sardan, 1999). And it is precisely this question that will concern us in what follows: What causes systemic corruption to be so sustainable and reproduce itself despite all the means of combating it?

Before we are able to answer the question, we will first take a closer look at the conceptualization of the phenomenon of systemic corruption.

Systemic corruption is first and foremost a political term that is often used to criticize or discriminate against certain deviations from the rules in a society. It often refers to the difficulties of states, their politics and their administration to achieve sufficient social acceptance for rules that are supposed to protect the public sector from the influence of private interests. In a first access, reference is made to the fact that corruption penetrates various aspects of a system or society and becomes firmly established in the structures, processes and institutions of a system. This access still remains wedded to an everyday theory approach to the phenomenon, but already introduces four important indicators and distinctions: (1) the regularity in the occurrence of corruption. “The relevant kind of corruption (1) is sustained and continued over time, (2) involves the participation, whether conscious or not, of multiple agents, and (3) takes the form of an identifiable institutional practice, (4) thus implying some degree of coordination among the participants” (Ceva & Lubomira, 2018: 3). In other words, systemic corruption occurs not only regularly, but also simultaneously or interconnectedly in different areas of society, involving many members of a given society.

In what follows, we want to look a more closely at these four aspects of our common understanding of systemic corruption and ask which theory we can best use to explain the emergence and reproduction of systemic corruption.

When systemic corruption is observed from an inside perspective by ethnographers and anthropologists, leaving aside the moral accounts of the observers, a complex understanding of systemic corruption emerges, taking up the productive side of systemic corruption as well (ibid. p. 45). For an anthropologist perspective on systemic corruption it is quite clear, that different societal contexts can have diverse and multiple moralities, and that “in some cultures, petty corruption may be accepted and also justified as a practice that smoothens social exchange” (Tornello & Venard, 2016: 35). “Considering the phenomenon from the perspective of the local people leads anthropologists to refuse to accept any a priori moral condemnation of corruption” (ibid. p. 48).

Systemic Corruption is also fundamentally understood as a social relationship and institutionalized practice in many sociological approaches (see Höffling, 2002; Pohlmann et al., 2016, 2019).

For a strong part of the recent social science literature, systemic corruption is related to the Rational Choice approach and described as a stable system, “where most individual actors expect others to act corruptly. The result is a collective action problem: the environment sets incentives for actors to act corruptly, even if it is not their personal preference to do so” (Mota & Pimenta, 2021: 74). An individually rational strategy produces an outcome that is collectively inferior.”In such a context, the costs of refraining from corrupt practices may be high and the benefits are likely to be low, especially if those defectors lack sufficient numbers or influence to create meaningful, systemic change through their honest behavior” (ibid, p.77). But the framework of a rational choice explanation is still underdeveloped, when it comes to the operationalization of indicators that enable the empirical measurement of systemic corruption in a given society.

The perspective of the institutionalist approach is presented in recent social science literature as well. In an institutionalist perspective, systemic corruption is not merely a property of an official’s individual behavior, but is to be understood by the properties of institutional practices (Ceva & Lubomira, 2018: 7). But till today, the theoretical frame of an institutionalist explanation is still underdeveloped as well as the operationalization of indicators, that beyond international statistics, allow field-based research (see e.g. Trombini et al., 2022; Valarini & Pohlmann, 2019).

This is, what our article is heading to: to provide explanatory frames and empirical indicators, that can help to answer this question. We introduce two analytical frames that supports us to get access to the phenomena behind and empirical measures to understand the mechanisms better, that lead to the sustainability of systemic corruption. We apply the institutional theory as well as the rational choice theory as explanatory frames (2), move on from there to the bystanding behavior of many actors, stabilizing systemic corruption (3), and explore the empirical indicators derived from the two explanatory frames and describe the methods we can use to verify their existence (4). Thus, we do not want to demonize systemic corruption from the outset, but rather we want to trace its productivity and answer the question of what the societal benefit, the societal function of systemic corruption is.

2 Two Theories of Systemic Corruption

Both theories, the Institutional theory and the Rational Choice Theory provide analytical frames to explain the “success” and the productivity of systemic corruption. In this chapter, we’re going to explore them further concerning the mechanisms that contribute to the reproduction of systemic corruption.

2.1 The Analytical Frame of Institutional Theory

According to institutional theory, systemic corruption builds on centuries-old social institutions, social systems of exchange that pervade society on the backstage of the formal institutional order. If we rely on the concept of institutional multiplicity, which addresses the coexistence of independent normative systems, e.g. one that the formal rule of law implies, and the other informal that legitimates the use of petty corruption, we can also assume the coexistence of different institutional orders that both complement and oppose each other (Mota & Pimenta, 2021: 75 f.; Mota & Cornelius, 2020: 3). Systemic corruption in a society builds on long-established, social systems of exchange whose unwritten rules of give and take come to the fore whenever the established formal rules and institutions, and the personnel who represent them, receive little recognition and trust in a society. It seems to be functional, a form of useful illegality, because it keeps society functioning even when—in the worst case—many official roles in society are seen as to be filled by “rogues” and “greedy elites”. Even in quantitative political and economic science studies it was observed “that corruption is less detrimental to efficiency in countries where institutions are less effective”. It was even “positively associated with efficiency in countries where institutions are extremely ineffective” (Méon & Weill, 2010: 244; see also Méon & Sekkat, 2005). Dreher and Gassebner did show in their study also, “that corruption facilitates firm entry in highly regulated economies”. (Dreher & Gassebner, 2013: p. 413).

The question of how to explain the persistence of systemic corruption despite permanent attempts to combat it can thus be answered by referring to the functionality of systemic corruption. Whenever the formal rules loose acceptance, the prevailing informal rules of the society take over.

  1. 1.

    If we start with the institutional theory, then we must first have empirical indicators that the everyday structures of give and take in a society are accepted even when they are prohibited or criminalized by laws and statutes. This measurable frequency of useful petty corruption, of minor rule deviations that are functional in a given society or organization also implies that a red line is internalized in everyday cognitive and normative institutions that marks the transition to culturally not accepted offenses. For most, knowing when to leave the path of everyday cheating and move on to “criminality” in the strict sense is part of the normalcy of petty corruption.

  2. 2.

    The widespread recognition of petty corruption is also associated with the natural recognition of minor personal advantage-taking. Part of the cognitive and normative institutions of systemic corruption is that illicit personal enrichment is accepted to the extent that it serves to “make ends meet,” i.e., to ensure economic subsistence. Subsistence-oriented acceptance of personal gain is an important indicator of systemic corruption. At the same time, it makes clear that pro-organizational crime, that is executed without illegal personal gain (see Pohlmann et al., 2020), is more closely interwoven with personal enrichment than it is the case in countries with casual corruption.

  3. 3.

    Front stage facades and back stage activities are drifting apart in many organizations. This is not an indicator for systemic corruption, but the forms of institutionalization of organizational misconduct, that are occurring on the back stage, are indicating systemic corruption. Standard operating procedures (SOP) for dealing with corrupt business practices are emerging, as are agencies and departments that address these business practices in legal organizations. This institutionalization at the organizational level is also an important indicator of systemic corruption.

  4. 4.

    Another important indicator of systemic corruption are institutional complementarities (see Hall & Soscice, 2011; Schneider, 2008; Taylor, 2020). It is precisely the close interconnectedness of different sectors of society that allows systemic corruption to be so sustainable and, at the same time, not only undermine but, conversely, stabilize a precarious institutional order. Systemic corruption is established across different sectors of society, and it is precisely this that creates institutional lock-ins and path dependencies on the one hand, which make it difficult to leave the path of systemic corruption. On the other hand, however, this is also a necessary precondition for a society to fall back on this “shadow economy” of systemic corruption when the formal institutional order no longer enjoys recognition and trust.

  5. 5.

    The fifth indicator is related to “systemic trust”. In this perspective, systemic corruption is indicated by the fact that there is a lack of trust in the public welfare-oriented function of regulatory institutions. It is an indicator of systemic corruption if there is widespread uncertainty about the manner of regulation and enforcement, i.e. whether the social control agencies are perceived as trustworthy or in need to be controlled themselves.

Sticking to the Approach of the Institutional Theory, we have to answer these questions:

  1. 1.

    Is useful petty corruption broadly accepted in a given society? (Cognitive, and Normative Institutions)

  2. 2.

    Is illicit personal gain accepted to the extent that it serves to “make ends meet,” i.e., to ensure economic subsistence. (Cognitive, and Normative Institutions)?

  3. 3.

    Do we find hidden routine operations, positions or departments in organizations dealing with corrupt practices? (Informal Regulative Institutions)

  4. 4.

    Are there institutional complementarities that promote functional wrongdoings? (Informal Regulative Institutions, Networks);

  5. 5.

    Is systemic trust, concerning the functioning of regulative institutions and the trustworthiness of social control agencies, missing inside a given society or organization? (Table 1)

Table 1 Indicators of Systemic Corruption according to the Institutional Theory
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Sometimes opposed, but partly connected to the institutional theory approach, Rational Choice theory is using another foundation and other assumptions to provide an analytical frame for the phenomena of systemic corruption.

2.2 The Analytical Frame of Rational Choice Theory

Persson et al. point out that systemic corruption solves not only problems of collective action, but can only be changed by the collective action of the majority of actors. They argue that the focus shall not be on principal-agent problems, but rather on the logic of collective action. Systemic corruption is prevailing and successful, because agents react to collectively anchored expectations to supplement society and its institutional order with socially embedded give-and-take structures where serious deficits in the societal order occur or trust in social institutions and elites is lacking. This also finds its expression in the fact that the principals do not adhere to the rules, laws and statutes they have enacted, but rather orient themselves to the ulterior, unwritten rules of the game of systemic corruption. The immunization of systemic corruption from the numerous attempts to combat it, is then achieved by “omission” of many to speak up. Those who speak up or take action against it have higher costs to take into account, and a greater likelihood that they will occur, compared to those who participate in or tolerate the systemic corruption game. When it comes to the combat against systemic corruption, the question is, whether and under which conditions the selective incentives are large enough to get enough players to stop playing the game (Persson et al., 2013: 450). „Quite contrary to what the principal-agent framework assumes, rather than reporting and punishing corrupt behavior, political leaders, as well as citizens, seem to at least passively maintain the corrupt system” (ibid p.454).

Although there have been some discussions concerning the two explanatory frames of rational-choice theory and their combination (Persson et al., 2013; Rothstein, 2018; Marquette & Pfeiffer, 2018; Persson et al., 2019), for the purpose of our article, we ourselves like to combine aspects of both frames: the collective-action and the principal-agent framework.

The question, then, of what makes systemic corruption so enduringly successful is answered in RC theory by reference to the following factors: 1. Corruption is perceived in a given society as an expected behavior; 2. The benefits for behaving corrupt are higher than the costs times the probability to be detected or that the crime is reported (Perrson et al., 2013, 2019; Marquette & Pfeiffer, 2018; Coleman, 1990); 3. The costs of speaking up are higher than the benefits, and the probabilities that the perpetrators will be punished are low. 4. On the backstage of legal organizations, the principals indirectly are rewarding the corrupt behavior, and not as much the whistleblowing; 5. The supposed “principled principal(s)” are also corrupt and not acting in the interest of the society;

Many do act in a corrupt fashion, and the expected payoffs of the corrupt behavior, as well as the odds of receiving the payoffs, are higher for most than the expected costs, as well as the probabilities of incurring any costs at all. Conversely, the benefits of formally doing the right thing and reporting wrongdoing seem negligible compared to the disadvantages of being socially discriminated as a traitor.

Sticking to the RC-Theory, we have to answer these questions, if we want to measure the grade of systemic corruption, that accompanies a given society:

  1. 1.

    Is there an established perception of societal or organizational members that many others are doing it, i.e. do we find taken for granted expectations that the others probably are going to commit useful petty corruption as well?

  2. 2.

    How high are the benefits of useful petty corruption, how many cases are detected and punished, and how high have been the fines?

  3. 3.

    How high are the expected costs for speaking up, and are there incentives for speaking up that exceed the expected costs? How many cases of whistleblowers do we find, and how have the whistleblowers and the perpetrators been treated?

  4. 4.

    Are the principals in a given society or legal organization informally rewarding useful corrupt behavior?

  5. 5.

    Is there a lack of systemic trust concerning the institutions, and the principals in a given society or organization? (Table 2)

    Table 2 Indicators of Systemic Corruption according to Institutional Theory, and Rational Choice Theory
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3 In Support of Systemic Corruption: Bystanding as Collective Action

Systemic corruption could not be so stable and durable as a social and organizational form if it did not also have support through the collective omission to do anything about it. This collective neglect occurs even when most members of a society want to do something about it. For rational choice theory, it is a suboptimal outcome, for all concerned, of the cooperation game between rational egoists. For institutional theory, there is a difference between the public articulated will to do something and the actual willingness and opportunities behind the facade, behind the stage of public life. The habits of thought and action, as well as the established forms of justification for failing to intervene, create a habitual pattern that is difficult to break even if one wants to do something about it in any case. The cognitive and normative restructuring in the perception of the situation often makes people following the regular course of action even when the persistence leads to crisis. And that is not even the case with systemic corruption. On the basis of such support structures, we assume, systemic corruption manages to protect itself from the regular normative hostilities, even to immunize itself to a certain extent through “systemic bystanding”.

By “bystanding as collective action” we mean the social establishment of mechanisms that lead to collective omission in a given society, to collective turning a blind eye to useful petty corruption and functional wrongdoings.

Thus, we ask: What are the mechanisms and structures that promote speaking-up behavior in the context of systemic corruption, and how strong are the mechanisms that leads to covering up behavior and silence in organizations? When we look for answers to what makes systemic corruption so resilient, we must also identify at what their support structures are. And an important factor here is always that there are incentives or habits in a society or organization to look the other way when others break the rules and thus to tolerate and accept petty wrongdoings. Why is this so common in the context of systemic corruption?

In this chapter, we will again stick to our introduction of the two explanatory frames, and give two different answers to this question. On the one hand, one can answer with the help of the institutional theory that in societies and organizations “parallel worlds” emerge in which informal interpretative orders and unwritten rules come into effect, which on the basis of hierarchy, and socialization processes provide strong justifications for the collective silence (IT1, IT2, IT4). Here, the collective omission no longer appears as an unintended consequence of action in the tragic interaction of rational egoists, but as a “normal”, norm-conforming action inside a given society, a legal organization and its personnel in a parallel interpretive order with the organization's own unwritten laws and rules. On the other hand, the rational choice theory proposes to understand the collective silence about the punitive acts as a rational action of rational egoists, who in their interaction realize a suboptimal outcome. It is suboptimal because it does not correspond to their primary preferences, because the perpetrators are not stopped. “In a context of systemic corruption, anyone seeking to report corruption, even the accused, may not resort to accountability institutions because there are no benefits (as punishment is unlikely) and there may be costs (in addition to resources—for example, time—there could be retaliation)” (Mota & Pimenta, 2021: 75).

3.1 Bystanding, and Organizational Bystanding

Especially in psychology and social psychology, there are numerous studies on so-called bystander effects (see only Latané & Darley, 1968; Latané & Nida, 1981; Fischer, 2011; Liebst & Philpot, 2018; Hussain et al., 2019 and many others). This refers to the phenomenon that bystanders do not intervene when they witness a crime and that the probability of intervention decreases the more observers there are at a crime scene. This is usually explained in the literature by three factors, in addition to personality traits such as “self efficacy” and gender, as well as effects of different situations (see, e.g., Krieger et al., 2017; Mabry & Turner, 2016; Leone et al., 2017).

  1. 1.

    first, it is argued that a cognitive redefinition of the situation takes place that allows for moral justifications. For example, sexual harassment is deciphered as harmless flirting behavior, thus eliminating the need to report the potential offense or intervene oneself (see, e.g., Allison & Bussey, 2016; Thornberg et al., 2020, and many others). (Cognitive restructuring).

  2. 2.

    second, easily accessible schemas that have been used frequently before are more likely to be applied to ambiguous situations than competing schemas that are not so easily accessible. For example, in the case of sexual harassment, ambiguity is reduced according to the motto: What teases, loves (see, e.g., Samosh, 2019; Garcia et al., 2002). (Reducing insecurity).

  3. 3.

    third, it turns out that the more information regarding a rule-breaking circulates among employees, the less each individual employee feels responsible to give hints or to intervene (see e.g. for meta-analyses: Fischer, 2011; Hortensius & de Gelder, 2018; but also for the discussion of positive bystander effects e.g.: Fischer & Greitemeyer, 2013). (Diffusion of Responsibility).

In the psychological and social psychological literature, it is rarely known neither exactly which explanatory approach lies behind these factors, nor how they should be classified in a theoretical explanation. The following remarks attempt to remedy this deficit. The currently available literature is also devoted to bystanding effects at the workplace. In addition to characteristics of the workplace and the employees (see only Hellemans et al., 2017), three organizational effects are particularly emphasized in the various studies:

  1. 1.

    bystander reactions depend on how the organization handles misconduct or suspicious incidents (see, e.g., Ferguson & Barry, 2011; Christianson, 2015). (Sanction culture effect).

  2. 2.

    intervention is prevented by tacit rules, such as not confronting colleagues in front of others, or by hierarchical barriers (see, e.g., MacCurtain 2018; Coyne et al., 2019; Ng et al., 2020). (Organisational culture effect).

  3. 3.

    due to managers having authority over employee performance appraisals and promotions, bystanders often choose to tolerate misconduct out of fear (see, e.g., Gao et al., 2015; Samosh, 2019). (Hierarchy Effect).

Once again, it is noticeable that the organization effect is not theoretically illuminated and not traced back to the basis of rational choice theory or the institutional theory. Although the effects are mentioned as results of the studies, they are not further substantiated theoretically.

3.2 Bystanding as Legitimate Behavior: The Institutional Theory

In this context, an institutional theory perspective shows that omission should not be understood as isolated opportunistic-criminal behavior of individual actors, but can be linked to institutionalized, i.e., taken-for-granted expectations and practices in their societal and organizational field. Within the particular societal or organizational field, it may be rational and legitimate to behave in silence because behind the formal facades collective bystanding fits the unwritten rules in a given society or organization.

Niklas Luhmann (1964, 304 ff.) refers to the organizationally useful deviation from formal rules as “useful illegality” in early work. In the case of organizationally useful illegality, there are, in turn, rule deviations that appear legitimate and rule deviations that appear illegitimate. The culture of a society or an organization then determines which rule deviations receive recognition and which do not. In our argumentation, we move to the next level of explanation, which is about how the organization and its employees deal with these rule deviations. We want to show that on this level, organizationally useful illegality or organizational deviance can occur, which does not report the serious appalling rule violations to the public prosecutor’s office but endures them according to the informal rules, interpretative orders, and informal norm orientations of the society.

Thus, applying the frame of the institutional theory of bystanding, we have to answer four questions: 1. Are there informal norms broadly accepted in a given society, that allow to accept, legitimate, or even justify petty corruption (I1, I4)? 2. Is it useful and legitimate to tolerate petty corruption and do we have access to more or better resources by bystanding (IT2)? 3. Do we have cognitive and normative institutions (IT4) and institutional complementarities (IT5) that foster bystanding by acting just formal, without detecting and punishing bystanding behavior in the case of petty wrongdoings. 4. Do we have low levels of trust in dealing with whistleblowing cases and in punishing the perpetrators (IT6)? (Table 3)

Table 3 Indicators of Bystanding according to Institutional Theory
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3.3 Bystanding as Rational Action: The Rational Choice Theory

If we want to explain how, in situations of systemic corruption, actors do not take action against corrupt acts but rather condone them, we need to draw on James Coleman’s (1990) bathtub framework or “boat model” for a macro-micro-macro-explanation in social science. In doing so, we have to relate the situations of systemic corruption, that the actors perceive on the macro level to their decisions on the microlevel. With reference to the perception of the situation, the alternatives to act for an actor are then provided with cost-benefit calculations and the likelihood that they will occur. Thereupon, the collective interaction of different actors is explored, explaining what happens back on the macro level (see Coleman, 1990; Esser, 1993). If we apply this “boat model” of Coleman, we can explain why actors cover for the misbehavior of others even when their preference is to do something about it. When acting together with other actors, they realize only a suboptimal result, which itself does not correspond to their preferences. This also helps to explain how this collective acquiescence stabilizes and secures patterns of systemic corruption in a given society.

(1) The Systemic-Corruption Situation: In the RC theory of systemic corruption, an important assumption is that systemic corruption develops along the logic of collective action. In countries with systemic corruption, it is part of the logic of the situation that expectations are socially institutionalized that do favor non-reporting of wrongdoings over reporting (RC1). When there is a perception that many will not speak up and get away with it, non-reporting behavior is further established. Thus, there will be no advantage of speaking up, quite the opposite. In criminology, this corresponds to the theory of differential contacts, which goes back to Edwin Sutherland (1973, 1983). A person becomes delinquent when there are primarily attitudes that favor deviations from rules over attitudes that negatively value wrongdoing. Low generalized and institutionalized trust in the regulative institutions is adding to the systemic corruption situation (RC6). There’s uncertainty concerning the answer to the questions: Will I be protected against discrimination, and stigmatization? What are the benefits of speaking up? What will follow after blowing the whistle, will the regulative institutions follow up? The hypothesis here is: The stronger the perceived expectations of the others towards omission (RC1) and the lower the trust in institutions and the supervisors are (RC6), the more likely wrongdoings are not reported.

(2) The Bridging Hypothesis: In the theory of cognitive framings, that we use as bridging hypothesis in the framework of Coleman’s boat, corrupt action shall first be recognized as wrongdoing and not be booked under the usual routine framings of a given society or organization (see e.g. Ceva & Lubomira, 2018). The hypothesis is, the more ambivalent the cognitive framing in a society is, the more wrongdoings are not acknowledged as such (RC2), the lower is the probability to report misconduct in an organization.

(3) The Logic of Individual Action: The benefits and costs of the individual neglect to speak up in the logic of selection are now determined according to the actor’s payoff matrix and the probabilities of their occurrence according to the societal or organizational culture. The hypothesis here is: The higher the costs of speaking up and their probabilities of occurrence are, compared to the benefits (RC3), the more likely it is that misconduct will not be reported.

(4) The Rule of Transformation: We need to also keep in mind the aspect of stigmatization of whistleblowers as traitors. The fear of stigmatization as a “denunciator” can be a significant deterrent to speaking-up. The hypothesis is: In a context where reporting misconduct is associated with negative labels and high risks of social ostracization (RC3), there is a higher probability to stay silent to protect their social acceptance and reputation among colleagues. Stigmatization does perpetuate a culture of silence and inhibits the development of a speak-up culture.

(5) The Logic of Collective Action: The game between actor A and actor B in the logic of collective action is not a game of prisoner’s dilemma, but a game of cooperation. In this game it can be rational that—under the condition that A and B have to achieve a common result—actor A tries to contribute as little as possible to this result, especially if he sees that actor B does a lot. This problem is known as the free-rider problem. Again, the suboptimal outcome in dealing with this so-called free-rider problem may be that neither A nor B contributes much to the joint outcome of collectively speaking up—unless there’s a strong pressure from outside (“principals”), from inside (supervisors) (RC5) or informal institutions rewarding the speaking up (RC4). It may follow from this form of cooperation that the logic of aggregation in systemic corruption situations does not lead to the joint outcome of reporting the crime, but to collective omission. The hypothesis is therefore: The lower the formal and informal pressure on the joint outcome of reporting appears for A and B in a given society (RC4), the more principal and supervisors are also expected to not follow up the “whistle” (RC5), the more likely such a suboptimal form of cooperation sustains (Table 4).

Table 4 Indicators of Bystanding according to Rational Choice Theory
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By applying this explanatory program, one can thus understand the interaction of actors in societies with systemic corruption that, under certain premises, contributes to the stabilization of systemic corruption even if the actors reject it individually.

4 How to Analyze and Measure Systemic Corruption

So how can we empirically determine whether there are more or less pronounced patterns of systemic corruption in a given society? How can we operationalize and measure the indicators presented in the previous chapter? The concluding chapter is devoted to this question. We will see that an understanding of systemic corruption and bystanding inspired by institutional theory often needs a different approach than that of rational choice theory. We also often need to combine methods, qualitative and quantitative, laboratory and field studies, experimental methods and group discussions. Very often, we cannot make use of the usual corruption indices, which are based on expert ratings, because they neither address the indicators nor allow for deeper assessments. From a methodological point of view, a test of the assumptions concerning systemic corruption has empirically high prerequisites that are not easy to meet methodologically. First, rule deviations are always embedded in a “dark field” that can usually only be approximated empirically by proxy variables (on dark field research, see e.g., Haverkamp, 2019). The “bright field” of detected cases tells us something about detected and possibly sanctioned rule violations, but always according to the attributions and investigative activities of social control agencies, e.g., according to the manner of prosecution. Second, the actual validity of the rules is therefore not easy to measure or assess. Although surveys and experiments provide access to rule addressees’ knowledge of rules and how they deal with hypothetical case situations, the external validity of such results is controversial (see, e.g., Petzold & Wolbring, 2018). Conversely, the de facto validity is often quantitatively determined by the number of rule violations detected, but this in turn depends on the control and sanctioning activities of social control agencies (see Kersting & Erdmann, 2014, p. 17).

There is no silver bullet for these methodological challenges of the research field. We suggest to address them in four ways:

  1. 1.

    Research on systemic corruption should be predominantly field-based, i.e. based on empirical findings in the respective field in order to keep external validity high.

  2. 2.

    Different approaches to the fields shall be tested by means of methodological combinations of qualitative research, e.g. the comparative analysis of cultural scipts, and standardized survey forms.

  3. 3.

    “Bright-field” oriented approaches shall be combined with indicator-based measurements of the “dark field” in order to assess the factual validity of the rules.

  4. 4.

    Experimental, as well as simulation and evaluation methods shall also be used in order to better deal with the problem of proving the RC-Theory assumptions.

The research on systemic corruption shall follow a multi-method strategy, combining quantitative and qualitative techniques, assessing the detected cases and exploring the dark field.

4.1 Content Analysis of Detected Cases: Court Records

Our first task to assess the cultural acceptance of useful petty corruption and find out to what extent we are dealing with an expected behavior (IT1, RC1) cannot be solved by a content analysis of court records. The number of anti-corruption cases and convictions in a given society cannot help us in this regard, because they only reflect the work of the judicial system or law enforcement agencies.

According to Kersting and Erdmann, the analysis of court records refers to the crime scene which is known and registered by law enforcement institutions. Unrecognized acts form the so-called “dark field” (Kersting & Erdmann, 2014, p. 11). Pending or non-judicialized cases are thus not available in the analysis of detected cases. While the detected cases can be measured well, the ratio between detected and undetected cases is usually indeterminate because the “dark field” can only be determined indirectly with the aid of self-reported delinquency or other tools (see below, see also Köllisch & Oberwittler, 2004; Naplava & Walter, 2006; for discussion: Oberwittler & Köllisch, 2004). For example, an increase in police crime statistics does not automatically imply an increase in criminal behavior (see also Köllisch & Oberwittler, 2004, p. 709; Oberwittler & Köllisch, 2004, p. 145). An intensification of prosecution by increased sensitivity of the investigating authorities, or the employment of new prosecutors, etc. may have led to this result. According to Naplava and Walter (2006), increased sensitivity to violence by the general public may be conducive to increased judicial activity through legislative measures, for instance. These can lead to the intensification of control measures, as a result of which, for example, due to increased readiness to report, an increase in detected cases occurs, which in turn can further an increase in the sensitivity to acts of violence (see Kersting & Erdmann, 2014, p. 17).

The method of court record analysis refers to data that are not scientifically produced but mediated by the practice of police, investigating authorities, courts etc. The information in the criminal records or the testing reports may differ from the actual events and provisional occurrences (see also Peter & Bogerts, 2010, p. 46; Kersting & Erdmann, 2014, p. 10). Therefore, it is important to know the conditions of data acquisition in order to assess the data of the court records given that the analysis of detected cases corresponds to a content analysis of documents that were not produced for the purpose of scientific analysis. The mechanisms of data production must be considered in the interpretation, but it still is a preferred choice of method to make sense of cases because of the lack of other methods and approaches.

The analysis of detected cases shall be supplemented by interviews with the involved defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges.

Quantitative Content Analysis: However, since we assume that in societies with systemic corruption there are rather less proceedings with convictions, they can be an indicator of the functioning of the judicial system in a given society (RC4, RC5). Gaining Gaining access to a sample of detected cases, sentenced by the courts, we can idetify, count, and estimate,, how high the benefits for perpetrators in detected cases have been, how high the potential costs for useful petty corruption, and the probabilities to be detected were (RC 2) as well, in the case of whistleblower cases, how whistleblowers are treated and what the benefits of speaking up have been (RC3). The ratio of tried cases and sentences per capita provides an indirect measurement for the costs of corrupt acts, the benefits of speaking up and the likelihood to be detected.

Qualitative Content Analysis: The qualitative content analysis of court records may add to this information how principals, high ranked executives in political or economic organizations did contribute to establish a corrupt legal organization (RC4, RC5), and if there have been departments, positions assigned to deal with the execution of useful corrupt actions (IT3). By analyzing detected cases, we can also find out, how much cross-over of societal sectors and actors in different societal sectors was revealed (IT4): Judges, Politicians, Third Parties, Companies etc.

The qualitative evaluation of court judgments, trials and court proceedings can be carried out through a classifying, summarizing content analysis like that of Mayring (Mayring, 2010). Based on the research question, the analyst charts categories that result from the material itself, so that argumentation structures become clear across all cases. This is a particularly suitable method for the evaluation of larger text corpora. The content analysis can be carried out with the help of MAXQDA, a software for qualitative data analysis and coding of relevant text passages—a method that has already been used several times in criminological studies (Table 5).

Table 5 Mapping the field of detected cases
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4.2 Survey Research

Systemic or institutional trust is seen to play a crucial part in the stability and maintenance of the social, political and economic system of a given society (IT6, RC6). “When trust breaks down, the social system is threatened with unrest, the democratic legitimacy of the political system is endangered and the legitimacy of the market-based economy is called into question” (Roth, 2009: 220). There are many surveys available that measure citizens’ level of confidence in various institutions (IT6).

Generalized Trust: The World Values Survey provides e.g. information on generalized trust and the Latinobarometer shows, that generalized trust is under 20% in 14 of the 19 countries surveyed. “The Latin American Public Opinion Project (https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/) shows in 2021: “More than three in five people in the average LAC country believe that most or all politicians are corrupt. Those who are more educated are more likely to believe that there is widespread corruption among politicians” (Lupu et al., 2021). Surveys such as Latinobarometer and World Values Survey show Latin Americans trusting families and friends (inner circle) rather than others not personally known. (Labarca & Mujika, 2022: 322). Most of the times, historical explanations of particularistic trust are available, highlighting the historical roots and the path dependency that led to different patterns of generalized and institutional trust (IT6, RC6).

Institutional Trust: In terms of institutional trust, e.g. “the Latinobarometer survey shows that, in the last decade, the percentage of people that trust their local Congress has surrounded 20%. This number has remained relatively stable during the last decade (2 points of difference between 2011 and 2020), and is a low figure if compared with Europe, for example. Political parties and governments have shown an even sharper decline. In 2011, people who trust political parties reached an average of 22%, while in 2020, it had declined to only 13% in the region. Government trust has had the sharpest decline: 40% in 2011 and only 27% in 2020.” (Labarca & Mujika, 2022: 322). Thus, indicators on trust on societal level can be derived from public opinion polls (IT6, RC6).

4.3 Exploring the Dark Field: Lab Experiments, Lab-In-The-Field Experiments, and Factorial Surveys

When dealing with rule violations, there is always a confrontation with a field in which illicit behaviors are carried out in a concealed and hidden manner. The so called “dark field” can often only be measured indirectly, through anonymous statements or with the help of experiments. We suggest to map that side of the phenomenon through a mixed methods approach combining three different methods:

a. Lab experiments with students in different countries: For the paper & pencil research by means of hypothetical case descriptions, so-called vignettes, it is a good starting point to carry out laboratory experiments with students for internal validity testing. The paper & pencil experiments essentially consist of a vignette (hypothetical case description) in which the influence of informal norms in a society resp. in a company on the propensity to cheat, and the acceptance of cheating can be tested (IT1, RC1). The operationalization of these informal expectations and patterns of acceptance can be varied: 1) they can be presented only in a general way (control group), 2) under the condition of a generalized pattern of systemic corruption in a given society (RC1); 3) under the condition of high benefits and low costs concerning cheating (RC2); 4) under the condition of including illicit personal gain necessary for economic reproduction (IT2) and 5) on the condition of a strong relationship of trust with the supervisor within a given company, informally rewarding the useful corrupt behavior (RC4);. In these different settings defined in this way, the participants are able to decide whether they are not acting corruptly, whether they deviate from the rules with personal gain, or whether costs, and benefits or the behavior of the supervisors have an impact on the propensity to cheat.

Labs-in-the-field: To measure the acceptance of rule deviations (IT1, RC1) and the likelihood to report (RC3), role-play experiments can be conducted in the context of compliance, vocational training or further education events inside organizations. The participants of the workshops should be randomly recruited as test persons. Before the role-play experiments surveys are carried out with the test persons to identify the baseline concerning the propensity to cheat and to speak up in the case of wrongdoings. After the role-play experiments, group discussions (see Sim/Waterfield 2019; Hennink et al.: 2019 etc.) with all participants take place and are analyzed with the hermeneutical methods to identify the collective mindsets at work (Pohlmann et al., 2014; Pohlmann, 2022), and relating it to the cognitive and normative institutions (IT1, IT4, RC1).

For the implementation, we can draw on a “construction test” and modify it for the purposes of the analysis of systemic corruption and systemic bystanding. The task for the participants as a team is to build a bridge of a certain length and width out of paper. For this purpose, materials such as paper, scissors, glue, etc. are provided. At the end, the team must not only have agreed on the architecture and the manner of construction of the paper bridge, but also present a concrete result, e.g. a paper bridge of 1.5 m length and 1 m wide.

When performing the construction tests, different types of rule violations are built in at different positions. A whistleblower hotline is available in the setting of the game. It then will be recorded how strong the propensity to cheat and to report deviations from the rules of the game is (RC2, RC3). The role of the supervisor in the set up of role-play workshop will be varied in order to find out, if it has an impact on the propensity to cheat (RC4, RC5) (Table 6).

Table 6 Evidence-Based Research design of the role-play experiments
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When carrying out the workshops, different types of rule violations can be built in at different positions. Since we are particularly interested in useful rule violations in favor of organizations (organizational crime or useful illegality), which often take place with the participation of managers, we can adopt the following experimental arrangement: at the level of middle management, a manager (initiated subject as part of the experimental arrangement) provides illicit resources to support the teams in building up the bridge construction in the specified time and quality. Information about this is communicated to all experimental participants in the form of deliberate hints with the help of an initiated observer. In the initial situation, a compliance department with a whistleblower hotline is available (baseline). We then record whether the willingness to report increases when two additional measures are introduced: (1) informal advice from the management board (“tone from the top”); (2) introduction of negative sanctions, related to the capacity of the teams to build the bridge. Thus, we could find out whether different measures had an impact on the likelihood to cheat and to report the wrongdoings.

Factorial Survey Experiments: Factorial survey experiments can be carried out also to clarify what is done by a member of a given society or an employee when faced with petty corruption. In addition, information is to be obtained on whether and which measures are chosen by “confidants” and which are not. For this purpose, a case of misconduct is presented to the test subjects in writing in the form of an online survey. The case is constructed in such a way that it takes place in a typical grey area of the society. The test subjects in the respective society or company under investigation are randomly divided into three groups. Depending on the group to which they belong, the setting in which the fictitious case of misconduct takes place changes:

  • Group 0 (Baseline)—The described useful petty corruption is presented in a general version. The test persons are asked how other members of a given society, an organization in the same field or a given organization would act: Would they cheat in that situation and/or would they report the wrongdoings?

  • Group 1 (tone from the top, collective benefits)—The described misconduct is now presented with an additional factor, introducing the principal or a supervisor, who’s executing informal pressure on the acceptance or covering up of the wrongdoing for the sake of the society or the organization (RC5). This can be varied with high benefits of useful petty corruption and low costs (RC2) as well as high costs for speaking up and low benefits (RC3).

  • Group 2 (illicit personal gain)—The described misconduct is now presented introducing the factor of illegal personal gain, that can be realized by cheating or tolerating the misconduct.

Now all three randomly selected groups can be compared and, measured by willingness to engage in corruption or to keep silence about corrupt acts, the impact of each factor can be accurately determined. With this evidence-based approach, the individual factors that play a role in systemic corruption along the two theories presented can each be examined in their modes of action and thus the dark field can be measured (Table 7).

Table 7 Mapping the “dark field” of useful petty corruption
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4.4 Qualitative Interview Analysis: Mapping the Institutional Order

For Scott (1995), cognitive elements form the framework through which reality is perceived. Scott understands institutions as consisting of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures. Cognitive institutions offer a taken-for-granted perspective, “natural” habits, and accepted rules for understanding the world (cf. Scott, 1995, p. 40). Normative institutions introduce collectively recognized rules about what is perceived as “right” and “wrong” and what “obligations” should guide action (cf. Scott, 1995, p. 37). Regulative institutions are understood as established rules to govern behavior and review others’ conformity to them, and to reach it by sanctions, rewards, or punishments (Scott, 1995, p. 35).

Collective ways of thinking are therefore important elements of cognitive and normative institutions and provide the cultural repertoire of how problems can be perceived and solved. Any institutional analysis therefore relies on assumptions about the underlying knowledge bases in a given culture and the collectively accepted rules. However, these bodies of knowledge and underlying cognitive and normative rules are rarely systematically analyzed or mapped. While regulative institutions are easily traced, cognitive and normative institutions are often derived from a general understanding of the culture or formal institutions without empirically elaborating them. However, research on systemic corruption in our perspective shall also be based on the empirical reconstruction of cognitive and normative institutions.

Addressing systemic corruption, we are relying on cognitive and normative institutions to identify the set of underlying informal rules that lead to systemic corruption (IT1, IT2, IT4). They become natural patterns of how to perceive, how to evaluate social facts, and how to act in a specific context of rule settings. The more they become part of the natural life worlds of the people in the social setting, the more institutionalized and stable the informal rules grow.

Taking cognitive and normative institutions seriously helps to understand the fact that even when the organization has set up the necessary compliance rules, deviant self-regulation can be persistent. As pointed out before, compliance rules are often myths and ceremonies in organizations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Organizations like to dress their windows to receive legitimacy and subsequently try to acquire impunity, to generate individual liability, or to just reduce the risks of severe penalties. Their cognitive and normative institutions are often very different from these formal rules, even deviating from the formal legal side of an organization. In our perspective, one of the most important characteristics of organizational crime and systemic corruption is that the unwritten cognitive and normative rules of an organization lay the foundations for the use of illegal means, no matter how strict formal compliance rules are.

Especially unwritten rules can be reconstructed qualitatively by means of a Collective Mindset Analysis, as far as they come to bear in the collective thought patterns, given they are collectively valid in the respective field and in the respective organizations. Group discussions can then help to also reconstruct collective thinking patterns as well as norms and habits that answer the question of how to prevent organizational wrongdoings.

4.5 Combining Methods

Each set of theoretical assumptions, questions, and indicators concerning systemic corruption requires different methodological approaches which can control each other and or can simply complement each other.

Concerning the both approaches to analyze systemic corruption, we thus suggest to measure the following indicators by combining the analysis of detected cases with the investigation of the dark field of systemic corruption, using qualitative methods as well as standardized ones (Table 8).

Table 8 Indicators of the institutional theory, and Applicable Methods
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5 Conclusions

Although the topic of systemic corruption has attracted a lot of attention and literature in recent years, the state of research in terms of empirical studies is still not very rich. A theory development on a larger scale has not taken place so far. It was important for us to briefly outline the state of research and the theoretical discussion here. More important, however, is to conceptualize systemic corruption and to operationalize the factors that come into play when conducting research on the topic. The usual recourse to international statistics on the subject is just as pointless as simply taking the data generated by the police. Ultimately, the number of rule deviations that are uncovered largely depends on the activities of the investigating authorities. So, we have to connect “dark-field analysis” with “bright-field analysis” in order to understand at least approximately how systemic corruption occurs, why it is sustainable and productive and how we can explain it.

We sought the starting point in the assumption that systemic corruption and modern formal rule of law embody two different social orders. Both orders provide sufficient guidance for the members of a given society. In societies where the rule of law is not fully established and enforced, we see that cutbacks in one cause the other to flourish (see also Méon & Weill, 2010; Dreher & Gassebner, 2013). Thus, whenever the institutional foundations of modern societies are challenged and lose their instructiveness and steering capacity, such societies can resort to systemic corruption.

Institutional theory explains this by the fact that the older patterns of systemic corruption have been preserved in the cultural repertoire and that it is easy to fall back on them in crisis situations of modern institutional orders. It is institutional path dependencies that take care of the cultural reproduction of this repertoire and thus make recourse to the parallel world of systemic corruption easy. The productivity of this older institutional order consists in the fact that it informally endows subsistence-oriented deviations from the rules with social recognition and legitimacy and thus, bypassing the formal rule of law, allows the supply of relevant goods and services to be maintained through reciprocal give and take. The fact that some people fare better than others is, after all, also true under the condition of a modern rule of law.

Rational choice theory explains this by saying that systemic corruption develops and stabilizes from its logic of collective action, which, assuming that we are dealing with rational egoists, continues to function even if they would prefer the modern rule of law. In the cooperation game of rational egoists, systemic corruption prevails even under this condition and reproduces itself as long as this cooperation game is not broken by the defection of many.

The validity of both explanations and also the degree to which systemic corruption can gain a foothold in a society are questions that can only be answered empirically. And it is precisely for this purpose that this article aimed to provide the tools. Applying these tools will hopefully enable us to gain a better, theoretically instructed and empirically controlled understanding of systemic corruption.