Abstract
In view of the remarkable differences between persons who tend to self-empowerment in the areas of Corona and climate, the chapter introduces the distinction between instrumental and expressive self-empowerment. Instrumental self-empowerment describes deviant behaviour of persons who are positive towards democracy, who try to support their political goals by means of unconventional political participation (here: Fridays for Future). Expressive self-empowerment, on the other hand, is deviant political behaviour with which the respective person not only expresses her dissatisfaction with certain political measures and the incumbent government, but with the functioning of democracy and the political system as a whole (here: Corona self-empowerment). Subsequently, we examine to what extent expressive self-empowerment can be understood as manifestation of a deficit of political representation, which has led to the perception of social exclusion and loss of control at the individual level, which in turn has, inter alia, resulted in a greater openness to conspiracy theories and ultimately expressive self-empowerment.
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Notes
- 1.
On the basis of surveys of participants of various demonstrations in Germany between 2003 and 2020, Daphi et al. (2021) come to a similar distinction. Their 'disenchanted critics' are characterized by low political trust, low satisfaction with democracy and low self-efficacy, thus resembling our expressive self-empowered. In contrast, the so-called confident critics display high political trust, high satisfaction with democracy and a high degree of self-efficacy, quite similar to our type of instrumental self-empowerment. Daphi et al. (2021) consider participants in Fridays for Future demonstrations as an example of 'confident critics', while Corona demonstrations were not investigated by Daphi and colleagues.
- 2.
According to a Politbarometer poll in May 2010, only 16% of those surveyed considered the euro crisis to be one of the two most important problems in Germany. In September 2011, this proportion had risen to 40 and 42%, in June 2012 it was at 41% and in August 2015 at 36%. Around the time of the Bundestag votes, public attention was sometimes even higher, for example in October 2011 at 63%, in July 2012 at 54% and in July 2015 at 49%. Between July 2011 and January 2013 (with the exception of the months of March and April 2012) as well as in March/April 2013 and in July 2015, and thus also in the period of the votes in question, the euro crisis even topped the list of the most important problems.
- 3.
This is at least true for the late 2010s. In the second half of the 2000s, especially after the far-reaching Hartz labor market reforms of the second Schröder government, there may well have been a perception of an economic and social policy party convergence, which was reflected in the formation of the Left in the (West German) party system.
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Kirsch, P., Kube, H., Zohlnhöfer, R. (2023). Discussion: Between Representational Gap and Conspiracy Belief. In: Societal Self-empowerment in Germany. Springer, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40865-7_6
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