Abstract
Using a practice-theoretical perspective on sociality, we investigate which social practices are reserved for humans. We argue that especially those practices that require participants to reciprocally recognize each other as persons clash with the conceptual understanding of robots. Furthermore, the paper provides reasons why this understanding of robots can be defended against a conception that wants to attribute the status of persons to robots based on their behavior. The simulated evaluative attitudes of robots are not rooted in the robots themselves but turn out instead to be merely opinion amplifiers of their developers or sociotechnical echo chambers of the users. However, we also argue that building robots that can perfectly simulate recognition claims nevertheless poses a problem since such devices would distort our social practices.
We would like to thank Laura Martena, Hauke Behrendt, Tom Poljanšek and Anne Clausen for helpful comments and exciting discussions that greatly contributed to the improvement of this paper.
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Notes
- 1.
See for example Sophia’s YouTube channel and especially this video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NwNULnXk9b0.
- 2.
One detailed account that analyzes the necessary and “rule-like” conditions for participating in a social practice was suggested by Hauke Behrendt (2018). Behrendt develops a concept of social “inclusion” (into a practice) that has four relational elements. He claims that a full conceptualization of (social) inclusion must determine (i) the subject of inclusion, (ii) the object of inclusion, (iii) the Instance of inclusion and (iv) the rules of inclusion. (Behrendt, 2018, pp. 162–182). We agree with Behrendt that the objects of social inclusion are social practices and further that the instance that formally “licenses” the inclusion or participation in a social practice is in a lot of cases not some bureaucratic agency but rather other participants within the practice. Behrendt understands the conditions for being a principal subject of inclusion as having the necessary properties and capacities for “[…] being a sufficiently competent social Agent” (Behrendt, 2018, p. 165 f.). Rules of inclusion can then further limit access to social practices with respect to further features, (ascribed) properties or capacities that a subject need to possess in order to be included into a social practice. We suggest to tweak Behrendt’s account of social inclusion into social practices a little bit for the purpose of this paper. Instead of conceptualizing the necessary conditions for principally being a subject of potential participation in a social practice as more or less general “social competences” we propose to distinguish between the functional conditions of realization of a social practice and sufficient further status conditions, whose realization must be ascribed “on top”.
- 3.
Correctly speaking, for a lot of cases the theoretical reconstruction of the normative sensitive behavior of participants can be made by supposing “success conditions” which are an explication of the implicit knowing-how of the participants).
- 4.
For the distinction between “manifest image” and “scientific image” see Sellars, 1962. The manifest image can be described as our ordinary understanding of ourselves and the world in which normativity, reasons and rationality plays a role. The scientific image is, roughly speaking, our explanation of the world via theoretical and stipulated, basic entities.
- 5.
It may be questioned that romantic love really requires that the partner is able to break up the relationship (see Misselhorn, 2021). This does, however, not touch the more fundamental problem to which we point.
- 6.
Thanks to Anne Clausen for pointing out that Hegel’s account of relations of recognition is embedded in a situation of the necessities of the human life form.
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Misselhorn, C., Störzinger, T. (2023). Social Robots as Echo Chambers and Opinion Amplifiers. In: Misselhorn, C., Poljanšek, T., Störzinger, T., Klein, M. (eds) Emotional Machines. Technikzukünfte, Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft / Futures of Technology, Science and Society. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-37641-3_10
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