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Konzepte des Lügens: Widersprüche und Vagheiten

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Über Widersprüche sprechen

Part of the book series: Contradiction Studies ((COSTU))

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Zusammenfassung

Vieles spricht dafür, dass Lügen nicht uniform ist, sondern dass es verschiedene Konzepte und Facetten des Lügens gibt. Im ersten Teil des Beitrags geht es um formale Aspekte des Lügens. Beim Lügen glaubt ein Sprecher, dass p, äußert aber nicht-p. Im Falle der Selbsttäuschung scheinen p und nicht-p aber kompatibel zu sein, und beim Bullshitten liegt Indifferenz gegenüber p vor, das heißt, der Sprecher stellt weder p noch nicht-p als wahr dar. Darüber hinaus kann Vagheit und Ungenauigkeit zum Lügen ausgenutzt werde. Im zweiten Teil des Vortrags geht es um Widersprüche in der aktuellen Lügenforschung, zum Beispiel (a) unverblümte Lügen sind (keine) Lügen, (b) Lügen mit unwahrhaftigen Implikaturen ist (nicht) möglich, und (c) Lügen ist (nicht) an Assertionen gebunden. Dazu werden auch experimentelle Befunde herangezogen und interpretiert. Schließlich geht es im dritten Teil um die moralische Frage, ob Lügen immer schlecht ist oder nicht vielmehr moralisch neutral.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Die Handbücher von Levine (2014), Meibauer (2019a) und Docan-Mogan (2019) stehen letztlich in dieser Tradition.

  2. 2.

    Williams (2002: S. 96): “I take a lie to be an assertion, the content of which the speaker believes to be false, which is made with the intention to deceive the hearer with respect to that content” (siehe auch Mahon 2019, S. 40–41).

  3. 3.

    Zum Beispiel: “Jacob’s friend Mary recently posted information on the internet that will alert the public to serious government corruption. Some federal agents visit Jacob and ask where Mary is in order to detain her. Jacob thinks that Mary is at her brother’s house, so he tells the agents, ‘She is at the grocery store.’ In fact, Mary is at the grocery store.”

  4. 4.

    Neben der psychologischen Version unterscheidet Horn (2018, S. 2) noch die ontologische Version und die logische Version.

  5. 5.

    Dieser stammt eigentlich aus dem Jahre 1986. Sein überwältigender Erfolg 19 Jahre später hängt offenbar mit den notorischen Lügen der Bush-Administration im Zusammenhang mit dem Irak-Krieg zusammen.

  6. 6.

    Interviewer: “I want to ask you about your criteria for nominating people to the US Supreme Court. Would you be willing to nominate anyone who supports the Roe v. Wade decision? Or, will you make opposition to abortion and Roe v. Wade a requirement for anyone you nominate?”.

    Candidate: “Look, there are lots of things to be taken into account when nominating someone for the Supreme Court. This isn’t the only relevant consideration. I want someone with a good legal mind and judicial experience who supports my judicial philosophy of following the constitution as it is written” (siehe Carson 2010, S. 60).

  7. 7.

    Siehe Carson (2010, S. 20): “Suppose that I witness a crime and clearly see that a particular individual committed the crime. Later, the same person is accused of the crime and, as a witness in court, I am asked whether or not I saw the defendant commit the crime. I make the false statement that I did not see the defendant commit the crime, for fear of being harmed or killed by him. However, I do not intend that my false statements deceive anyone. (I hope that no one believes my testimony and that he is convicted in spite of it.).” Für Carson ist diese falsche Feststellung eine Lüge, aber eben nicht täuschend.

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  1. Deutsches Institut, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, Mainz, Deutschland

    Jörg Meibauer

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    Cornelia Stroh

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Meibauer, J. (2022). Konzepte des Lügens: Widersprüche und Vagheiten. In: Nintemann, J., Stroh, C. (eds) Über Widersprüche sprechen. Contradiction Studies. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-34804-5_2

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