Abstract
To philosophers and non-philosophers alike, there is an intuitive appeal to the claim that authenticity and self-knowledge are intimately connected. But once we start looking beyond this intuitive appeal and examine the claim, we see that it is not warranted. In particular, it fails to consider self-ignorance and thus does not elicit an adequate theory of the epistemological nature of authenticity. This article extends the dyad ‘authenticity and self-knowledge’ into the triad ‘authenticity, self-knowledge and self-ignorance’, thereby leading to a modified self-conception of human beings as well as a modified conception of authenticity. Self-ignorance is a feature of the human self-conception and so being authentic involves being self-ignorant and admitting to the potential for self-ignorance. Once this modified self-conception that assigns a central place to self-ignorance is in view we see that the individualistic go-to conception of authenticity—being true to oneself—is inadequate and may need to be replaced, e.g. by a relational conception.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
I won’t be engaging with the question of the value or disvalue of authenticity. For an extensive case against authenticity, see Feldman (2015). I also won’t be discussing arguments in favor of the value of (self-)ignorance (e.g. Taylor and Brown 1988; McKay and Dennett 2009). There is evidence on the practical value of positive illusions: self-evaluation bias is found in non-depressed agents but not in depressed agents. Having false beliefs about oneself may improve one’s well-being and one’s performances (e.g. Taylor and Brown 1988). On the other hand, self-ignorance may also be harmful because it may keep the agent from meeting her goals, from recognizing reality as it is (cf. Tugendhat 2010, p. 99), and, of course: from understanding herself and, possibly, from being authentic. I also bracket any discussions of authentic critical reflection within debates about autonomy. Christman (2009) in his procedural theory of autonomy introduces authenticity as a condition of autonomy; authenticity is “non-alienation upon historically sensitive, adequate self-reflection, given one’s diachronic practical identity and one’s position in the world” (Christman 2009, p. 155). Authenticity in this context amounts to ownership of beliefs and values. I will instead be addressing what one may describe as authenticity as a way of being—a way of believing, hoping, wanting, acting and so on. This second interpretation encompasses authenticity as ownership of beliefs and values as used in the literature on autonomy, but it is broader inter alia because it refers to concrete acts, including speech acts (cf. e.g. Oshana 2007, p. 424).
- 3.
Cassam introduces ten conditions that distinguish substantial self-knowledge from trivial self-knowledge (2015, p. 31 f.).
- 4.
There are different interpretations of the restricted conclusion depending on one’s views on trivial self-knowledge and substantive self-knowledge, e.g. one may hold that only substantive self-knowledge is in jeopardy and trivial self-knowledge is safe. I won’t enter into these details, because the distinction is not relevant here. Instead we need to distinguish, very generally, potential and actualized self-ignorance.
- 5.
This insight is similar to the existentialist remarks about the human condition as “objective facticity” and “subjective transcendence” (Sartre 1956), and “good faith”, viz. authenticity, as “honest acceptance of your human condition” (Feldman and Hazlett 2013, p. 173). But the present insights about self-ignorance are more specialized because they concern cognitive capacities of human beings. They don’t require the existentialist framework and thus I develop them independently from it.
- 6.
Thanks to Naomi Scheman for mentioning this article to me.
- 7.
Cf. Cassam (2015, p. 204) on moderate pessimism about self-knowledge.
- 8.
Original: “[…] die Vermeidung von Unwahrheit im bereits bestehenden eigenen (individuellen und kollektiven) Meinungssystem” (Tugendhat 2010, p. 101).
- 9.
Original: “eine Dynamik des Klärens und Begründens” (Tugendhat 2010, p. 109).
- 10.
Original: “Selbstschutz, Schwachheit, habitualisierte Selbsttäuschung” (Dietz 2017, p. 232).
- 11.
Original: “die Einstellung des sozialen Umfelds, […] Institutionen der Selbstaufklärung, […] langfristige Strategien der Selbstbindung” (Dietz 2017, p. 230).
- 12.
Thanks to Christine Bratu, Martin Hurni, Andrea Lailach-Hennrich, Vanessa Rampton, Naomi Scheman and Annett Wienmeister for helpful discussions of the claims in this paper.
References
Alicke, M.D., and O. Govorun. 2005. The Better-than-average effect. In The self in social judgment, ed. M.D. Alicke, D.A. Dunning, and J.I. Krueger, 85–106. Philadelphia: Psychology Press.
Burge, T. 1996. Our entitlement to self-knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96: 91–116.
Cassam, Q. 2015. Self-knowledge for humans. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Christman, J. 2009. The politics of persons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dietz, S. 2017. Selbsttäuschung als sozialer Prozess. In Selbsttäuschung. Eine Herausforderung für Philosophie und Psychoanalyse, eds. E. Angehrn and J. Küchenhof, 223–239. Weilerswist: Velbrück.
Dunning, D. 2011. The Dunning-Kruger effect. Advances in experimental social psychology 44: 247–296.
Elga, A. 2005. On overrating oneself… and knowing it. Philosophical Studies 123 (1–2): 115–124.
Feldman, S. 2015. Against authenticity: Why you shouldn’t be yourself. Lanham: Lexington Books.
Feldman, S., and A. Hazlett. 2013. Authenticity and self-knowledge. Dialectica 67 (2): 157–181.
Frankfurt, H. 1988. Identification and externality. In The Importance of what we care about, ed. Harry G., 58–68. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Garcia, E.V. 2015. The virtue of authenticity. In Oxford studies in normative ethics, vol. 5, ed. M. Timmons, 272–295. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hampshire, S. 1971. Freedom of Mind. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Krueger, J. 1998. Enhancement bias in descriptions of self and others. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 24 (5): 505–516.
Lynch, M. 2004. True to life: Why truth matters. Cambridge.: MIT Press.
May, L. 1991. Metaphysical guilt and moral taint. In Collective responsibility: Five decades of debate in theoretical and applied ethics, eds. L. May and S. Hoffman, 239–254. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
McKay, R., and D. Dennett. 2009. The evolution of misbelief. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32: 493–510.
Moran, R. 2001. Authority and estrangement: An essay on self-knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Nisbett, R., and T. Wilson. 1977. Telling more than we know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review 84 (3): 231–259.
Open Science Collaboration. 2015. Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science. Science 349 (6251). https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aac4716.
Oshana, M. 2007. Autonomy and the question of authenticity. Social Theory and Practice 33 (3): 411–429.
Plato. 1993. Philebus (trans: Frede, D.). Indianapolis: Hackett.
Sartre, J. 1956. Being and nothingness. New York: Washington Square Press.
Schwitzgebel, E. 2012. Self-Ignorance. In Consciousness and the self: New essays, ed. J. Liu and J. Perry, 184–197. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shoemaker, Sydney. 2009. Self-Intimation and second order belief. Erkenntnis 71: 35–51.
Taylor, S.E., and J.D. Brown. 1988. Illusion and well-being: A social psychological perspective on mental health. Psychological Bulletin 103 (2): 193–210.
Taylor, S.E., and J.D. Brown. 1994. Positive illusions and well-being revisited: Separating fact from fiction. Psychological Bulletin 116 (1): 21–27.
Tugendhat, E. 2010. Anthropologie statt Metaphysik, 2. edn. München: Beck.
Vogt, K. 2012. Belief and Truth: A skeptic reading of plato. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
El Kassar, N. (2020). Authenticity and the Significance of Self-Knowledge and Self-Ignorance. In: Brüntrup, G., Reder, M., Gierstl, L. (eds) Authenticity. Studien zur Interdisziplinären Anthropologie. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-29661-2_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-29661-2_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer VS, Wiesbaden
Print ISBN: 978-3-658-29660-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-658-29661-2
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)