Abstract
While there is plenty of research investigating the methods for choosing parliamentary candidates and their consequences, only a few studies have explored the preferences of party members for various selection modes. This article focuses on those party members actively involved in candidate nominations, separated in leaders, delegates and rank-and-file. As it is well known, party activities are pivotal when it comes to procedural reforms. Our data base is a representative survey in the run-up of the 2017 national election within all current Bundestag parties that includes selections at the distict level and for party lists. The data show that there is very limited reform support for open primaries. Moreover, party members frequently opt for the procedures with which they are long familiar. Evidence for assuptions that party elites prefer inclusive procedures to circumvent mid-level activists could not be found. Looking at context factors, general meetings are more strongly supported in competitive settings. Regarding list selections, a strong membership base and a large territorial size of a federal state lead to favoring the delegate principle which points to organizational and practical considerations.
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Notes
- 1.
Indeed, apart from those pure selectorate types there are also mixed and more complex variants if one looks beyond solely the final decision stage. Concerning the selections for the 2017 Bundestag elections, for example, in some SPD organisations at district level all members could take part in a consultative vote if at least two contenders for a candidacy stepped forward. Subsequently, a delegate convention had the final say (if more than two persons were competing at the membership level, delegates chose from the two best ranked names) and decided who would run for the district. Thus, selectorate types are somewhat blended through this formal two-stage process. We will investigate these mixed processes in detail in future studies. Moreover, it is a matter of course that informal preselection activities regularly precede or accompany any formal selection steps (for Germany see e.g. Höhne 2010; Detterbeck 2016; Reiser 2011).
- 2.
The other three dimensions for investigating selection procedures identified by Rahat and Hazan (2001)—candidacy restrictions, centralisation/decentralisation, voting/appointment systems—bear some relevance to democratisation, yet inclusiveness of the selectorate can be regarded as the most important criterion. For example, aspects of decentralisation also concern the distribution of power within parties; however, if selection is controlled by a small party elite, decentralisation does not yield substantial democratization (Pennings and Hazan 2001, p. 273).
- 3.
- 4.
BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN (Green Party), CDU (Christian Democratic Union), CSU (Christian Social Union), DIE LINKE (Left Party), SPD (Social Democrats).
- 5.
Importantly, seats in the Bundestag are allocated on the basis of the second ballot by a system of proportional representation. Due to so-called ‘surplus seats’ (Überhangmandate) and, since 2013, ‘compensation seats’ (Ausgleichsmandate) more than the regular 598 MPs are usually elected to the German Bundestag (e.g. Dehmel and Jesse 2013). After the 2017 election 709 candidates entered parliament, 299 from electoral districts, 410 via party lists.
- 6.
While most party statutes specify that a delegate convention is to be held for a list nomination, a small number of them (e.g. the FDP in Hamburg and the Green Party in Hesse) stipulate membership conferences to select list candidates. Some others (mostly within the Left Party) allow both variants, thus usually leaving the final decision at the leadership level. As to nomination procedures in the districts, most state-level statutes contain no information or give the final say to the district organisations themselves. In some cases, they stipulate that district candidates are to be selected by a membership convention (e.g. several FDP state parties, the CDU in Saxony, the Left Party in Brandenburg) or a delegate conference (e.g. the CDU in Thuringia, the SPD in Bavaria).
- 7.
Aspirants are defined as individuals (not necessarily party members) pursuing a candidacy.
- 8.
If strategic coordination and compromises come about more easily through selection by delegates, they should produce lists which are more representative, and hence more satisfying for the whole organisation.
- 9.
The sample choice is also based on the assumption that candidate selection is a key function for parties with realistic chances of gaining mandates in parliament.
- 10.
Questionnaires were distributed at the beginning, usually while the convention’s chairperson introduced the research project, as agreed in advance, and collected at the end of the convention. In addition, the methodological approach to collecting data included scientific observations and qualitative interviews with rank-and-file members, party leaders and aspirants for a candidacy. The observational data consist of more than a thousand pages of documentation, while the interviews amount to almost 64 h of digital audio. For all parties except for the AfD we obtained and used recommendations (from the party headquarters or parliamentary party groups) as to who to ask to take part in our study.
- 11.
More precisely, layered random sampling was adopted to include all parties evenly.
- 12.
Refusals were received from all parties. These were motivated by various reasons (from alleged bad experiences with academic research and fears that delicate internal matters could become public, to concerns that the social integration of party members would suffer through outsiders being present). Initially, we strongly expected that approaching the newly founded AfD would be the most difficult. This was confirmed in the early stages of data collection since several AfD district organisations turned down our request. However, once we had obtained access to a critical mass of AfD events others exhibited greater readiness when we made aware of the party conventions already visited. A report documenting sampling and data collection is available online (www.iparl.de/forschungsprojekte.html).
- 13.
In addition, further candidate nominations of special interest were attended at both state and district level. The figures presented in this paper, however, only refer to the base random sample mentioned.
- 14.
Aspirants for a candidacy and the members electing the candidates received different questionnaires. In the case of a dual role (aspirants who also belong to the selection body) respondents only had to fill in the questionnaire for aspirants.
- 15.
The party-related response rates in the districts are (total number of respondents in brackets): AfD 51.9% (153), CDU 64.5% (901), CSU 69.7% (319), FDP 66.7% (306), Green Party 72.1% (344), Left Party 56.8% (193), SPD 64.2% (798). For list selections the figures were as follows: AfD 43.8% (952), CDU 50.6% (634), CSU 28.4% (61), FDP 46.4% (887), Green Party 74.2% (875), Left Party 64.6% (625), SPD 51.9% (886).
- 16.
Membership conventions are attended predominantly by rank-and-file members, as well as by party leaders, functionaries and activists who are all likely to become delegates in the case of a delegate conference. Hence, methodologically we do not distinguish between rank-and-file members and delegates but rather between delegates and non-delegates.
- 17.
It is important to note that the goal of preserving influence does not have to be pursued for purely self-serving reasons. As mentioned in section two, this can also arise from the assumption that delegates are better able to select candidates in the party’s best interests.
- 18.
Skilled in organising party politics, those members are also relevant for reform processes at least as regards promoting modification of selection rules.
- 19.
Our argument might be undermined to some extent if inclusive selection conferences attract more candidates in any case. However, there is no evidence that membership conferences encourage competition. Reiser (2013, p. 143) found no significant effect between the level of competition and the mode of selection in Germany.
- 20.
According to this criterion, the CSU (Bavaria), the CDU in Rhineland-Palatinate and the SPD in the Saarland are regarded as large parties. To the group of medium-sized parties belong the CDU in Baden-Württemberg, Hesse and North Rhine-Westphalia and the SPD in Bavaria, Berlin, Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia. All other party organizations at state level are categorized as small parties. Data for the AfD are our own calculations, based on Niedermayer (2017, p. 377).
- 21.
The size of small states (including city states) amounts to less than 3000 km2 (Bremen, Hamburg, Berlin, Saarland) while that of medium-sized states ranks from 15,800 to 23,200 km2 (Schleswig-Holstein, Thuringia, Saxony, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony-Anhalt, Hesse, Mecklenburg Western Pomerania). Large states cover 29,600–35,800 km2 (Brandenburg, North Rhine-Westphalia, Baden-Württemberg) and very large states more than 47,600 km2 (Lower Saxony, Bavaria).
- 22.
The same is true for the FDP. Out of the 96.7% of respondents who were non-delegates 11.3% preferred delegate conferences (not shown in table).
- 23.
Lübker’s and our data are not totally comparable since we gave respondents selection options to choose from while party members in his study only had to answer whether they considered party primaries in the district beneficial or not. Yet, juxtaposing both data indicate that rank-and-file members and delegates hold somewhat different views. In Lübker’s study, the accumulated shares of party members who support party primaries in the district are as follows: CDU: 85.5%, CSU: 79.4%, FDP: 79.9%, Green Party: 81.4%, Left Party (at that time called PDS): 85.1%, SPD: 85.8% (Lübker 2002, p. 726).
- 24.
Remarkably, the data for the FDP, not represented in parliament for the first time, do not stand out as anomalous: for list selections in particular, they are very similar to those of the Green and the Left Parties.
- 25.
Another method of dealing with this problem would be to accumulate both inclusive and exclusive categories. However, this is difficult at the theoretical level as open primaries and party primaries are relatively different variants of inclusiveness. In any case, the results of a multivariate analysis using such cumulation hardly differs from the analysis restricted to membership and delegate conferences. We would like to thank Malte Cordes for his methodological support.
- 26.
There is no relevant degree of multicollinearity between the independent variables.
- 27.
1.5 is the reciprocal of the odds ratio of 0.686 in Table 3 and, thus, refers to the likelihood of the opposite event (i.e. opting for membership conferences) occurring.
- 28.
1.2 is the reciprocal of the odds ratio of 0.825.
- 29.
Given the non-linear relationship we interpret our findings as justifying additional research in this direction.
- 30.
In these concluding remarks we omit the influence of leadership level, political occupation and competitiveness on selection preferences because of their minimal significant effects.
- 31.
While our analysis allows the interpretation that both power considerations (which do not necessarily have to be pursued for self-serving reasons) and practical considerations come into play when opting for a selection mode, we believe the party members’ views on the pros and cons of various nomination procedures should be investigated more thoroughly.
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Schindler, D., Höhne, B. (2020). No Need for Wider Selectorates? Party Members’ Preferences for Reforming the Nomination of District and List Candidates for the German Bundestag. In: Bukow, S., Jun, U. (eds) Continuity and Change of Party Democracies in Europe. Politische Vierteljahresschrift Sonderhefte. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-28988-1_10
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