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Natural-Science/Technical Peace Research

  • Jürgen AltmannEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

The current international system is based on the sovereignty of nation states. Most of them defend their sovereignty with military power. Because technological superiority provides advantages in war, they make great efforts in military research and development. The consequence is an arms race with reduced warning and decision time, and thus, increased instability. As a way out of this security dilemma, states can reduce military threats through arms control and disarmament with verification of compliance, confidence and security building measures, non-proliferation and export control. Since this is a complex issue requiring (technological) expertise, they need to be supported by natural-science/technical peace research. This strand of research analyses dangers resulting from new military technologies, develops concepts for limitation as well as methods and technical means of verification, and investigates proliferation risks. IT peace research is particularly needed to contain the dangers of a cyber arms race as well as to provide better tools for disarmament and verification.

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References

Recommended Reading

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.TU Dortmund, Physik und AbrüstungDortmundGermany

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