Abstract
The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a paradigmatic example of unequal institutional order. It distinguishes between states that own nuclear weapons and those that do not and prohibits the have-nots from seeking the same status as nuclear weapon states. This inequality enshrined in the treaty would seem to militate against justice concerns and undermine the stability of the treaty. Why do states put up with such unequal recognition? Recognition theory, which IR scholars have mostly used to understand struggles against inequalities in world politics, seems ill-equipped at first sight to explain the creation and persistence of this unequal treaty. And yet, a close analysis reveals that different types of recognition needs, articulated by different states, heavily shaped both the process leading up to the adoption of the treaty and its contents. While the NPT denied states the equal right to the possession of nuclear weapons, it, nonetheless, responded to justice concerns of the parties. In particular, it responded to demands for participatory equality and for the recognition of individual national identities and achievements. Thus, the multidimensionality of recognition needs explains why recognition politics ultimately enabled and stabilized an unequal institutional order.
This chapter was first published as Fehl, C. (2015) Understanding the Puzzle of Unequal Recognition: The Case of the Nuclear-Non-Proliferation Treaty. In C. Daase, C. Fehl, A. Geis, Georgios Kolliarakis (Eds.), Recognition in International Relations: Rethinking a Political Concept in a Global Context (104–22). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. I would like to express my appreciation for granting publication rights.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Contrary to the argument that Article VI resolved a ‘security dilemma’, the argument about normative satisfaction still holds if we assume that the NWS’ disarmament commitment was primarily symbolic and that the chance of their eventual complete nuclear disarmament was small.
- 3.
The analysis draws on earlier analyses which point to the importance of national identity conceptions for countries’ non-proliferation policies, but without systematically relating this factor to other recognition dynamics in the non-proliferation regime.
- 4.
All German quotes translated by the author.
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Fehl, C. (2019). Understanding the Puzzle of Unequal Recognition: The Case of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In: Fehl, C., Peters, D., Wisotzki, S., Wolff, J. (eds) Justice and Peace. Studien des Leibniz-Instituts Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-25196-3_3
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