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Funktionen und Positionen in Familienunternehmen

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Management von Familienunternehmen

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Zusammenfassung

In diesem Kapitel werden Sie zunächst erfahren, wie Entscheidungsprozesse in Familienunternehmen vollzogen werden. Die Möglichkeiten, in Unternehmen zu entscheiden, werden juristisch über die Inhaberschaft konstituiert. Anders formuliert: Nur derjenige, dem Anteile des Unternehmens gehören, kann die damit verbundenen Rechte wahrnehmen; er oder sie hat jedoch auch die damit einhergehenden Verpflichtungen zu erfüllen.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Vgl. nachfolgend Habig und Bernighaus (2004).

  2. 2.

    Mitglieder mit Sitz in Deutschland sind beispielsweise die Friedrich Schwarze GmbH & Co. KG (gegr. 1664) oder die Möllergroup GmbH & Co.KG (gegr. 1730).

  3. 3.

    Neben dem Liquiditätsabfluss ist die Bewertung des Unternehmens in Scheidungsfällen vielfach der größte Zankapfel, denn es gibt keine gesetzlich vorgeschriebene Bewertungsmethodik für solche Fälle. Vgl. hierzu Felden (1996).

  4. 4.

    Wobei es die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer familieninternen Nachfolge im Management erhöht, wenn das erstgeborene Kind männlich ist (vgl. Bennedson et al. 2007).

  5. 5.

    In einem Drittel aller Familienunternehmen arbeiten beide Ehepartner gemeinsam mit (Fitzgerald und Muske 2002).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Entrepreneurship, Hochschule für Wirtschaft und Recht Berlin, Berlin, Deutschland

    Birgit Felden

  2. Institut für Organisation und Personal, Universität Bern, Bern, Schweiz

    Andreas Hack

  3. Stiftungslehrstuhl Führung von Familienunternehmen; Institut für Familienunternehmen (iFUn), Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Deutschland

    Christina Hoon

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  1. Birgit Felden
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Correspondence to Birgit Felden .

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Felden, B., Hack, A., Hoon, C. (2019). Funktionen und Positionen in Familienunternehmen. In: Management von Familienunternehmen. Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24058-5_6

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