Abstract
Supply contracts are used to align the incentives of channel members and there exists a rich body of literature that analyzes how different types of supply contracts can be used to do so (for an overview see Cachon, 2003). Buyers in a channel are typically modeled in one of two ways: either as a monopolist facing a downward-sloping market demand (see Tsay and Lovejoy, 1999) or as a newsvendor facing an exogenous retail price and random market demand (Lariviere, 1998). We focus on the newsvendor-buyers.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Becker-Peth, M. (2012). Designing Contracts for Irrational but Predictable Newsvendor. In: Behavioral Supply Chain Contracting. Edition KWV. Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-23885-8_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-23885-8_2
Publisher Name: Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden
Print ISBN: 978-3-658-23884-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-658-23885-8
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsBusiness and Management (R0)