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Wirtschaftskammern als politische Akteure: Organisation, Strategie und Einfluss

  • Patrick BernhagenEmail author
Chapter

Zusammenfassung

Chambers of Commerce (nachfolgend: CoC) sind wichtige Akteure im Kontext Beziehungen zwischen Unternehmertum und Politik. Sie mobilisieren wichtige Ressourcen – vor allem Personal, Finanzen und Legitimität – und beteiligen sich an der Formulierung und Umsetzung von öffentlicher Politik. Mehr noch, die Kammern mobilisieren „komplementäre Ressourcen“, indem sie an der Politikimplementation teilnehmen und eine Selbstregulierung in ausgewählten Politikfeldern organisieren. Da das politische Handeln generalistischer Wirtschaftsverbände Prozesse der internen Abstimmung von Forderungen voraussetzt, stellt die Zunahme direkten unternehmerischen Lobbyings eine beklagenswerte Entwicklung dar. Zugleich können gestiegene Erwartungen in Selbstregulierung von den Koordinationskapazitäten der CoC profitieren.

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut für SozialwissenschaftenUniversität StuttgartStuttgartDeutschland

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