Skip to main content

Part of the book series: Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft ((VGPO))

  • 699 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter analyzes constitutional politics in post-socialist Bulgaria from 1990 until 2014. After a brief outline of the constitution-making in 1990/1991, special emphasis is placed on the four amendment laws that reformed the new constitutional order in 2003, 2005, 2006 and 2007. As the analysis shows, constitutional politics was dominated by the process of EU accession. In contrast, all amendment initiatives before and after this process were not able to reach sufficient majorities in parliament. A constitutional conflict between the state branches regarding the issue of legally admissible amendments had a decisive influence on the path of reform. The vast majority of the amendments dealt with the reform of the judiciary and the structure and competencies of the parliament.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    The new constitutions of Serbia (September 28, 1990) and Croatia (December 22, 1990) had been enacted earlier, but still in the framework of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (see the respective chapters in this volume).

  2. 2.

    Additionally, seven new transitional and concluding provisions were introduced.

  3. 3.

    Some articles were changed several times.

  4. 4.

    This first modern Bulgarian constitution was named after its place of origin, Veliko Tărnovo, which had been the capital of the second medieval Bulgarian Empire (1186–1396).

  5. 5.

    It was published on July 13, 1991 in DV 56/1991 and entered into force that day.

  6. 6.

    The other five never made it to the parliamentary plenum.

  7. 7.

    Following the French example, the term ‘magistrate’ is used in Bulgaria as an umbrella term for judges, prosecutors and investigators.

  8. 8.

    Another possible assumption regarding the court’s motivation is that a sheer hard-line judgment could have provoked the simple inescapability of elections to a GNA in order to make EU accession possible. As a consequence, then, this would have enabled the parliament to amend any part of the constitution, and the interpretative judgment of the constitutional court would have turned out a Pyrrhic victory.

  9. 9.

    Art. 39, Sec. 1 of the Protocol concerning the conditions and arrangements for admission of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union (2005).

  10. 10.

    The constitution of 1991 had introduced a threefold division of the judicial branch into the courts, the prosecution office and the investigating magistrates (see Art. 117–128 Const.). This tripartition caused great inefficiency and corruption, since these judicial bodies did not only act almost fully independently from the other state branches, but also from one another.

  11. 11.

    Furthermore, the ombudsman was allowed to challenge laws before the constitutional court if he deemed them infringements on citizens’ rights and freedoms. Thus, the Bulgarian citizens were provided with—at least indirect—access to constitutional justice.

  12. 12.

    Based on this, the new Criminal Procedure Code (DV 86/2005) left only about 3 % of all criminal cases under the investigating magistrates’ responsibility.

  13. 13.

    After the end of the period under investigation here, Borisov’s government indeed presented a new draft amendment in spring 2015, aiming at new steps towards judicial reform as demanded by the European Commission. This draft included a reform of the SJC, particularly its division into two colleges (one for judges and one for prosecutors and investigating magistrates). On December 16, 2015, it was adopted by the NA in the third reading by a 189-to-39 majority with 1 abstention, following a “historical compromise” between GERB and DPS, but against the votes of the BSP (Mediapool 2015). However, the amendment caused bitter altercations within the government and the resignation of the minister of justice, Hristo Ivanov, since key elements of enhancing the responsibility of the prosecutors had been deleted between the first and the second reading. Additionally, it remained an open question at the time of finalizing this book, whether the amendment would not be annulled by the constitutional court, on the grounds of it being under the exclusive competence of the GNA.

  14. 14.

    The electoral law can be understood as a part of the constitutional order (see Merkel 2010, 113ff.). Even if formally it has no constitutional status, it has constitutional relevance de facto due to its centrality for the political process.

  15. 15.

    Keeping in mind the controversial influence this rigidity had on the reform policies of the 2000s (see above), this is a typical example for how formal rules can lead to diverging results under different circumstances.

References

  • Bălgarski helzinski komitet. 2015. Pravata na čoveka v Bălgarija, 2014g. Sofija: Bălgarski helzinski komitet.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barany, Zoltan. 2002. Bulgaria’s Royal Elections. Journal of Democracy 13(2): 141–155.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beichelt, Timm. 2012. Prinzip ‘Worst Practice’? Demokratiedefiziente Regimeelemente und die Wechselwirkungen mit der EU-Ebene. Frankfurt/Oder: Viadrina.

    Google Scholar 

  • Centăr za izsledvane na demokracijata. 2005. Bălgarskata konstitucionna reforma v konteksta na prisăedinjavaneto na Republika Bălgarija kăm Evropejskija săjuz (2003–2005). Sofija: Centăr za izsledvane na demokracijata.

    Google Scholar 

  • Demokracija. 1991. Daily newspaper ‘Demokracija’, March 25: 1.

    Google Scholar 

  • Freedom House. 2014. Nations in Transit 2014: Eurasia’s Rupture with Democracy. Washington D.C., New York: Freedom House.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ganev, Venelin I. 2013. Post-Accession Hooliganism: Democratic Governance in Bulgaria and Romania after 2007. East European Politics and Societies 27: 26–44.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goranova, Galja. 2006. Blizo 50 % ot zakonite na prehoda prieti bez kvorum. Sega, June 6. http://www.segabg.com/article.php?id=272984 (accessed April 20, 2015).

  • Grimm, Dieter. 2009. Constitutions, Constitutional Courts and Constitutional Interpretation at the Interface of Law and Politics. In The Law/Politics Distinction in Contemporary Public Law Adjudication, ed. Bogdan Iancu, 21–34. Utrecht: Eleven.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hein, Michael. 2007. Verfassungspolitisches perpetuum mobile in Bulgarien. Südosteuropa Mitteilungen 47(3): 62–78.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hein, Michael. 2009. Die Europa- und Parlamentswahlen 2009 in Bulgarien. Südosteuropa Mitteilungen 49(5): 44–61.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hein, Michael. 2013a. Verfassung und demokratische Konsolidierung im postsozialistischen Bulgarien. Eine formale Institution als entscheidender Faktor im südosteuropäischen Kontext? Südosteuropa Mitteilungen 53(3–4): 84–101.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hein, Michael. 2013b. Verfassungskonflikte zwischen Politik und Recht in Südosteuropa. Bulgarien und Rumänien nach 1989 im Vergleich. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holmes, Stephen, and Cass Sunstein. 1995. The Politics of Constitutional Revision in Eastern Europe. In Responding to Imperfection. The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment, ed. Sanford Levinson, 275–306. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Höpken, Wolfgang. 2009. Gibt es eine ‘balkanische’ politische Kultur? Südosteuropa Mitteilungen 49(6): 30–47.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ibryamova, Nuray. 2013. European Union political conditionality and minority rights: Compliance in Bulgaria and Romania. International Journal of Human Rights 17(3): 350–367.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klisarov, Petăr. 2014. Ogledalo na protestite. Sofija: Itztok-Zapad.

    Google Scholar 

  • Korvela, Paul-Erik. 2013. Postdemocracy and the End of History. Economic and Political Studies 1(1): 136–155.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Merkel, Wolfgang. 2010. Systemtransformation. Eine Einführung in die Theorie und Empirie der Transformationsforschung, 2nd ed. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mediapool. 2015. Promenite v konstitucijata minaha s glasovete na DBG i SDS. Mediapool.bg, December 16; http://www.mediapool.bg/promenite-v-konstitutsiyata-minaha-s-glasovete-na-dbg-i-sds-news243175.html (accessed December 16, 2015).

  • Miteva, Ekaterina, and Tihomira Mihajlova. 2009. 60 na sto ot zakonite v parlamenta glasuvani bez kvorum. Novinar, June 25. http://novinar.bg/news/60-na-sto-ot-zakonite-v-parlamenta-glasuvani-bez-kvorum_Mjk4MTs2OQ==.html (accessed April 20, 2015).

  • Nikolov, Krasen. 2007. Novijat PR-kontrol na sădebnata vlast. Mediapool.bg, February 2; http://www.mediapool.bg/noviyat-pr-kontrol-na-sadebnata-vlast-news125646.html (accessed April 20, 2015).

  • Paunov, Hristo. 2013. Revizija na konstitucijata na Republika Bălgarija. Materialnopravni i procesualnopravni aspekti. Sofija: Feneja.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ragaru, Nadège. 2010. How do anti-corruption initiatives fly … and where to?—A Bulgarian case study. Südosteuropa Mitteilungen 50(3): 40–63.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schönfelder, Bruno. 2005. Judicial Independence in Bulgaria: A Tale of Splendour and Misery. Europe-Asia Studies 57: 61–92.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schrameyer, Klaus. 2002. Die bulgarische Justiz als Nebenregierung. Südosteuropa 51: 594–605.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smilov, Daniel. 2006. EU Enlargement and the Constitutional Principle of Judicial Independence. In Spreading Democracy and the Rule of Law? The Impact of EU Enlargement on the Rule of Law, Democracy and Constitutionalism in Post-Communist Legal Orders, ed. Wojciech Sadurski, Adam Czarnota, and Martin Krygier, 313–334. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Spasov, Boris. 1994. Razhodka okolo razporedbite na edna glava ot konstitucijata. Săvremenno pravo 5(2): 95–105.

    Google Scholar 

  • Spirova, Maria. 2006. The parliamentary elections in Bulgaria, June 2005. Electoral Studies 25: 616–621.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tanchev, Evgeni. 1998. The Constitution and the Rule of Law. In Bulgaria in Transition. Politics, Economics, Society and Culture after Communism, ed. John D. Bell, 65–90. Boulder: Westview.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tanchev, Evgeni, and Martin Belov. 2008. Constitutional Gradualism: Adapting to EU Membership and Improving the Judiciary in the Bulgarian Constitution. European Public Law 14(1): 3–19.

    Google Scholar 

  • Todorov, Antony. 2006. The Role of Political Parties in the Bulgaria’s Accession to the EU. Journal of Constitutional Law in Eastern and Central Europe 13(2): 173–232.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vachudova, Milada Anna, and Aneta Spendzharova. 2012. The EU’s Cooperation and Verification Mechanism: Fighting Corruption in Bulgaria and Romania after EU Accession. Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies.

    Google Scholar 

Sources

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Michael Hein .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Appendix: Constitutional Politics in Bulgaria 1991–2014

Appendix: Constitutional Politics in Bulgaria 1991–2014

Dates of amendment and implementation

Articles

Constitutional subfields

Short analysis of the reform process

09/25/2003/

09/26/2003 (partly 01/01/2004)

Art. 129, 131–132

• Judiciary

• Regular amendment by NA with broad three-fourths majorities (final vote: unanimously with 230 votes)

• Main actors: all political parties in parliament, constitutional court (as antecedent veto player)

• Duration: about 6 months

02/18/2005/

02/25/2005 (partly 01/01/2007)

Art. 4, 22, 25, 42, 85, 105

• Human and civil rights

• EU membership

• Legislature

• Executive

• Regular amendment by NA with broad three-fourths majorities (final vote: 226-to-5 majority without abstentions)

• Main actors: all political parties in parliament; President and constitutional court (with regard to an antecedent interpretative judgment)

• Duration: about 11 months

03/30/2006/

03/31/2006

Art. 70, 84, 91a (new), 127–129, 130a (new), 150

• Human and civil rights

• Legislature

• Other control/oversight agencies

• Judiciary

• Constitutional court

• Regular amendment by NA with slight three-fourths majorities (final vote: 184-to-34 majority with 1 abstention)

• Main actors: governing parties BSP, NDSV and DPS + oppositional BNS

• Duration: about 4 months

09/13/2006/

09/26/2006

Art. 129

• Judiciary

• Amendment invalidation by constitutional court

• Main actors: Supreme Court of Cassation (applicant party) and constitutional court

02/02/2007/

02/06/2007 (partly 01/01/2008)

Art. 9, 59, 62, 81, 84, 130–132, 132a (new), 141

• Military

• State structure

• Legislature

• Judiciary

• Regular amendment by NA with slight three-fourths majorities (final vote: 191-to-28 majority with 7 abstentions)

• Main actors: governing parties BSP, NDSV and DPS + oppositional BNS and ODS

• Duration: about 9 months

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Hein, M. (2016). Bulgaria. In: Fruhstorfer, A., Hein, M. (eds) Constitutional Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-13762-5_6

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics