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Theoretische Konzepte zur Beurteilung von Managed Care

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Zusammenfassung

Der folgende Abschnitt wendet sich vor allem an theorieinteressierte Leser. Anhand der beiden aus der Neuen Institutionenökonomie stammenden Ansätze sollen einige Grundgedanken zur Gestaltung von Institutionen und von Anreiz- und Kontrollsystemen vorgestellt werden.

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Correspondence to Volker Eric Amelung .

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Amelung, V.E. (2022). Theoretische Konzepte zur Beurteilung von Managed Care. In: Managed Care. Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-12527-1_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-12527-1_3

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