Abstract
The aim of this chapter is to explore the social consequences of recent developments in moral psychology aimed at psychologizing morality: developments that Jonathan Haidt terms ‘the new synthesis’ (NS). As a prelude, I diagnose what in the content of the NS undergirds those consequences and how it differs from the Aristotelian alternatives with which it is commonly contrasted. More specifically, I explore the NS’s take on moral ontology, moral motivation, moral ecology and moral domains. In all cases, I deem the response offered by the NS to radical rationalism hyperbolic and argue that Aristotelianism provides a more plausible, if more moderate, alternative. In the final section, I address the putative social consequences of the NS, both general consequences for public conceptions of the moral life and more specific consequences for moral education at school. In both cases, I argue that the consequences of adopting the NS position range from the unfortunate to the outright pernicious.
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Kristjánsson, K. (2016). The ‘New Synthesis in Moral Psychology’ versus Aristotelianism. Content and Consequences. In: Brand, C. (eds) Dual-Process Theories in Moral Psychology. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-12053-5_12
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