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Finanzpolitik

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Politik und Wirtschaft

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Zusammenfassung

Dieser Beitrag liefert einen Überblick über die politik- und wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Forschung zur Erklärung staatlichen finanzpolitischen Handelns. Dabei wird gezeigt, dass die durch den politischen Prozess erzeugten finanzpolitischen Entscheidungen sich häufig von jenen Maßnahmen unterscheiden, welche eine rein an Effizienzkriterien ausgelegte ökonomische Analyse empfehlen würde. Die Untersuchung der politik-ökonomischen Determinanten der Finanzpolitik erlaubt ein besseres Verständnis staatlichen Handelns und ermöglicht die Formulierung wissenschaftlich fundierter Reformvorschläge. Einige davon werden am Ende des Beitrags diskutiert.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Geschwister-Scholl-Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, München, Deutschland

    Oliver Pamp

  2. Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insb. Mikroökonomik, BTU Cottbus-Senftenberg, Erich-Weinert-Str. 1, 03046, Cottbus, Deutschland

    Jan Schnellenbach

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  1. Oliver Pamp
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  1. Universität Münster, Münster, Germany

    Karsten Mause

  2. Universität Münster, Münster, Germany

    Christian Müller

  3. Universität Münster, Münster, Germany

    Klaus Schubert

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Pamp, O., Schnellenbach, J. (2018). Finanzpolitik. In: Mause, K., Müller, C., Schubert, K. (eds) Politik und Wirtschaft. Springer Reference Sozialwissenschaften. Springer, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-06227-9_9

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