Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Verantwortung, Freiheit und Wille

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Handbuch Verantwortung

Part of the book series: Springer Reference Sozialwissenschaften ((SRS))

Zusammenfassung

Der Artikel behandelt die kausale Rolle des Willens im Blick auf moralische Verantwortung. Untersucht wird, welche Bedeutung in diesem Kontext Handlungsfreiheit und Willensfreiheit haben, wie sie sich zueinander und zu alternativen Möglichkeiten verhalten und ob sie mit dem Determinismus vereinbar sind.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 159.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Literatur

  • Augustinus. De libero arbitrio, 387–395.

    Google Scholar 

  • Austin, John Leslie. 1970. Ifs and cans. In Philosophical papers, Hrsg. James Opie Urmson und Goffrey James Warnock, 205–232. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bieri, Peter. 2001. Das Handwerk der Freiheit. Über die Entdeckung des eigenen Willens. München: Hanser.

    Google Scholar 

  • Broad, Charlie Dunbar. 1952. Ethics and the history of philosophy. Selected essays. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chisholm, Roderick Milton. 1964. Human freedom and the self. The Lindley lecture. Kansas: Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clarke, Randolph. 2003. Libertarian accounts of free will. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, Daniel Clement. 1984. Elbow room. The varieties of free will worth wanting. Oxford: MIT.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fischer, John Martin. 1994. The metaphysics of free will. An essay on control. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fischer, John Martin. 1999. Recent work on moral responsibility. Ethics 1:93–139.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fischer, John Martin, und Mark Ravizza. 1998. Responsibility and control. A theory of moral responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Frankfurt, Harry Gordon. 1969. Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. The Journal of Philosophy 23(1969): 829–839.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frankfurt, Harry Gordon. 1971. Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. The Journal of Philosophy 1:5–20.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frankfurt, Harry Gordon. 1999. The faintest passion. In Necessity, volition, and love, 95–108. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Guckes, Barbara. 2003. Ist Freiheit eine Illusion? Eine metaphysische Untersuchung. Paderborn: Mentis.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hunt, David P. 2000. Moral responsibility and unavoidable action. Philosophical Studies 2: 195–227.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kane, Robert. 1996. The significance of free will. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Keil, Geert. 2013. Willensfreiheit, 2. Erweiterte Aufl. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, David. 1997. Finkish dispositions. The Philosophical Quarterly 187(1997): 143–158.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Locke, John. 1995. In An essay concerning human understanding, Hrsg. Peter Harold Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mele, Alfred Remen. 1995. Autonomous agents. From self-control to autonomy. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mele, Alfred Remen, und David Robb. 1998. Rescuing Frankfurt-style cases. Philosophical Review 1(1998): 97–112.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moore, George Edward. 1912. Ethics. The Home University Library of modern knowledge Nr. 54. London: Williams and Norgate.

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Connor, Timothy. 2000. Persons and causes. The metaphysics of free will. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pereboom, Derk. 2001. Living without free will. Cambridge studies in philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Schälike, Julius. 2010. Spielräume und Spuren des Willens. Eine Theorie der Freiheit und der moralischen Verantwortung. Paderborn: Mentis.

    Google Scholar 

  • Seebaß, Gottfried. 2006. Handlung und Freiheit. Philosophische Aufsätze. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strawson, Peter Frederick. 1962. Freedom and resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy 48(1962): 187–211.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strawson, Galen. 1986. Freedom and belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strawson, Galen. 1994. The impossibility of moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 1(2): 5–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tugendhat, Ernst. 1987. Der Begriff der Willensfreiheit. In Konrad Cramer, Hans Friedrich Fulda, Rolf-Peter Horstmann und Ulrich Pothast, Hrsg. Theorie der Subjektivität, 373–393. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

    Google Scholar 

  • van Inwagen, Peter. 1983. An essay on free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • van Inwagen, Peter. 2002. Free will remains a mystery. In The Oxford handbook of free will, Hrsg. Robert Kane, 158–177. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vihvelin, Kadri. 2004. Free will demystified. A dispositional account. Philosophical Topics 1(2): 427–450.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vihvelin, Kadri. 2013. Causes, laws, and free will: Why determinism doesn’t matter. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wallace, Richard Jay. 1994/1998. Responsibility and the moral sentiments. Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Watson, Gary. 1975. Free agency. The Journal of Philosophy 8(1975): 205–220.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Watson, Gary. 1987. Free action and free will. In Agency and answerability. Selected essays, Hrsg. Gary Watson, 161–196. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Watson, Gary. 2003. Introduction. In Free will. Oxford readings in philosophy, Hrsg. Gary Watson, 2. Aufl., 1–25. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wolf, Susan. 1990. Freedom within reason. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Lehrstuhl III, Universität Mannheim, Schloss, 68131, Mannheim, Deutschland

    Julius Schälike

  2. Fachbereich Philosophie, Universitätsstr. 10, 78464, Konstanz, Deutschland

    Julius Schälike

Authors
  1. Julius Schälike
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Julius Schälike .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Kiel, Germany

    Ludger Heidbrink

  2. Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    Claus Langbehn

  3. Universität Wien, Wien, Austria

    Janina Loh

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Schälike, J. (2017). Verantwortung, Freiheit und Wille. In: Heidbrink, L., Langbehn, C., Loh, J. (eds) Handbuch Verantwortung. Springer Reference Sozialwissenschaften. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-06110-4_13

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-06110-4_13

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer VS, Wiesbaden

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-658-06109-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-658-06110-4

  • eBook Packages: Social Science and Law (German Language)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation