Interdisziplinäre Anthropologie pp 68-73 | Cite as
Wie sozial ist Kognition?
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Zusammenfassung
In diesem Beitrag wird aus wissenschaftsphilosophischer Sicht der Beitrag von Vogeley/ Schilbach/ Newen kommentiert.
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