Wie sozial ist Kognition?

Part of the Interdisziplinäre Anthropologie book series (ANTHRO)


In diesem Beitrag wird aus wissenschaftsphilosophischer Sicht der Beitrag von Vogeley/ Schilbach/ Newen kommentiert.


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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut für PhilosophieOtto-von-Guericke-Universität MagdeburgMagdeburgDeutschland

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