Abstract
This study is concerned with the charity market in Germany. An outline of the economic literature on collective goods and voluntary donations is followed by a theoretical model of strategic fundraising, and by an empirical investigation of donor-fundraiser interaction.
The theoretical part presents philanthropy as a strategic conflict between recipient and contributor, where excessive fundraising can be limited by anticipatory bounteousness, or by regulatory means, i- e., tax exemption of charitable gifts. While not offering a fully-fledged positive model of fundraising, this approach elucidates the problem of inefficiency associated with the common fundraising process. Moreover, it states a case in favour of granting tax benefits to contributors that goes beyond the standard Pigouvian argumentation.
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© 2014 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden
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von Kotzebue, A. (2014). Summary. In: On Collective Goods, Voluntary Contributions, and Fundraising. Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-04012-3_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-04012-3_5
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Publisher Name: Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden
Print ISBN: 978-3-658-04011-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-658-04012-3
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