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Historical Background and Political Contextualization

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China-Russia Relations in Central Asia
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Abstract

Any analysis of recent developments in Sino-Russian relations has to devote some time to historical sources of current positions and conflicts. Lo Bobo underscores this need when he asserts that, “for both [China and Russia], the key to the rapprochement of recent years lies in their ability to transcend a dark and often tragic shared history” (Lo 2008:17). A brief analysis of this history, appropriate to the confines of this book, shall be provided in the following chapter, whereas different stages and patterns of the relationship are to be identified and relevance for the current situation to be highlighted.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See also: Yu 2007:60 and Wilson 2004:15, who put the number at 1.7 million square kilometers.

  2. 2.

    By splitting Mongolia from China to create a communist client state, the SU inflicted further territorial losses on China. Moscow also refused to return any territories acquired by the Tsarist Empire in the 19th century.

  3. 3.

    For the full text see: http://untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/6/27/00011314.pdf (03.04.2011).

  4. 4.

    See also: Wu 2009:120. Wu divides Russian foreign policy in the 1990s in two phases, a liberal pro-Western one under Foreign Minister Kozyrev until 1996, and a “Eurasia-centered pragmatism” under Primakov and Ivanov.

  5. 5.

    Primakov at one point even proposed an alliance between Russia, China and India, quickly rejected by the Chinese side, which claimed not to be interested in entering into an alliance with any country (Wishnick 2001:147).

  6. 6.

    For an analysis of the treaty, see Yu 2001:120-127; for the full text see: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t15771.htm (13.04.2011).

  7. 7.

    See also: Wu 2009:125, who dates this major shift to mid-2006 and connects it, among other factors, to electoral politics. Putin, he argues, tried to boost his chosen successor in the presidential election of 2008, Dmitry Medvedev, by assuming a more populist-nationalist posture.

  8. 8.

    The “color revolutions“ denoted here, are the “Rose Revolution“ in Georgia 2003, the “Orange Revolution“ in Ukraine 2004-2005, and the “Tulip Revolution“ in Kyrgyzstan 2005. The names for these non-violent revolutions are inspired by Czechoslovakia’s “Velvet Revolution“ in 1989.

  9. 9.

    In May 2003, it was agreed between the Russian company “Yukos“ and the “Chinese National Petroleum Company“ (CNPC) that the pipeline would end in China. After a generous Japanese counter-offer and the dissolution of “Yukos“ by the Russian state in 2004, Putin decided for the route to Japan, but has since shifted back to the Chinese option.

  10. 10.

    see also Zhao 2008:20: Zhao considers the Putin administration to be very apt in making use of a tactical flexibility, but ascertains that rapid changes make partners feel uncertain and reduce trustworthiness on the international stage; and Lo 2008:95-100,147.

  11. 11.

    For the Friendly Treaty see: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t15771.htm (30.03.2011); for the SCO Charter see: http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=71 (30.03.2011).

  12. 12.

    This echoes the Kremlin’s approach as analyzed by Dmitry Trenin, director of the Moscow Carnegie Center, see Bomsdorf 2009:5.

  13. 13.

    See also Bosbotinis 2010:77-79.

  14. 14.

    The CSTO is an intergovernmental military alliance, founded in 1992 and currently comprising Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the RF, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Other than the SCO, it includes only one dominant player, the RF.

  15. 15.

    see also Yu (2007): pp. 79-80.

  16. 16.

    See also FN 9.

  17. 17.

    See FN 2.

  18. 18.

    See FN 2.

  19. 19.

    See also: Lo 2008:95-100,147.

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© 2014 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden

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Eder, T. (2014). Historical Background and Political Contextualization. In: China-Russia Relations in Central Asia. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-03272-2_2

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