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The Relational Dimension of CSO Representativeness – Assessing Accountability, Participation, and Satisfaction

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Their Members’ Voice
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Abstract

This chapter reports the results of accountability to members, member participation, as well as member and staff satisfaction. The first part is dedicated to the perspective of Brussels-based officers on the three aspects of CSO representativeness (5.1). The ensuing section evaluates the responses given by representatives from selected member organisations (5.2). In the final part, the findings from both groups of interviewees are summarised (5.3). They are discussed and interpreted in chapter 6.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    These addresses are members, donors, supporters, stakeholders/beneficiaries, the general public, nature/future generations, the EU, and national governments.

  2. 2.

    To ensure the anonymity of interview respondents, the neutral pronoun they/their/them is used instead of she/her and he/him when citing interviewees.

  3. 3.

    Three CSO representatives said that it had never happened to them (interviews with CSOs # 4, 6, 7).

  4. 4.

    Interview CSO # 13

  5. 5.

    Interview CSO # 2

  6. 6.

    Interview CSO # 12

  7. 7.

    Interview CSO # 11

  8. 8.

    Interview CSO # 3

  9. 9.

    Interview CSO # 12

  10. 10.

    Interview CSO # 10

  11. 11.

    Interview CSO # 10

  12. 12.

    Interviews CSOs # 5, 7, 12

  13. 13.

    Interviews CSOs # 2, 3, 10, 12, 13

  14. 14.

    Interviews CSOs # 1, 6

  15. 15.

    Interview CSO # 5

  16. 16.

    Interview CSO # 12

  17. 17.

    Interview CSO # 1

  18. 18.

    Interview CSO # 5

  19. 19.

    Interviews CSOs 8, 9, 11

  20. 20.

    Bylaws CSO # 8

  21. 21.

    Interview CSO # 6. They are composed of experts appointed by member associations and companies and chaired by a member organisation representative. The committees meet in Brussels every three months.

  22. 22.

    Interview CSO # 10

  23. 23.

    Interview CSO # 13

  24. 24.

    Interview CSO # 5

  25. 25.

    Interview CSO # 11

  26. 26.

    Interviews CSOs # 2, 4, 6, 8, 12

  27. 27.

    Interview CSO # 4

  28. 28.

    Interview CSO # 8

  29. 29.

    Interview CSO # 12

  30. 30.

    Interview CSO # 6

  31. 31.

    Interviews CSOs # 3, 8, 12

  32. 32.

    Interview CSO # 12

  33. 33.

    Interview CSO # 2, 6, 9

  34. 34.

    Interview CSO # 3

  35. 35.

    Interview CSO # 6

  36. 36.

    Interview CSO # 7

  37. 37.

    Interviews CSOs # 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 13

  38. 38.

    Interviews CSOs # 10, 12

  39. 39.

    Interview CSO # 8

  40. 40.

    Interviews CSOs # 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 13

  41. 41.

    Interviews CSOs # 3, 5, 6, 12

  42. 42.

    Interviews CSOs # 7, 8

  43. 43.

    Interview CSO # 9

  44. 44.

    Interview CSO # 11

  45. 45.

    Interview CSO # 4

  46. 46.

    Interview CSO # 3

  47. 47.

    One officer specified that it varied between staff members and their specific tasks whether they communicated more with the inside or the outside; another one said that it depended on the day. One CSO did not provide an answer to this question.

  48. 48.

    It is interesting to note that five of these CSOs are active in CSDP. A reason for this difference could be the fact that most CSOs in External Trade Policy have been active at the EU level for much longer than CSOs in CSDP. Their members may have recognised the importance of the EU a long time ago and no longer need to be persuaded of it. This explanation is backed up by several interviews, in which CSO officers emphasised that convincing their members of the EU’s importance was not or no longer necessary. One officer said that they “had to convince them [the member organisations, author’s addition] in the beginning and that was why we had these problems with creating [CSO name]”. It was necessary “to make them aware of the possibility to achieve some improvements through the [European] Trade Policy” (Interview CSO # 4). They sometimes argued – quite plausibly – that members would not be part of an EU-level association if they did not think the EU was important. However, this reasoning does not seem to hold for the member organisations of CSOs in CSDP who, according to the Brussels staff, still need to be convinced of the EU’s importance.

  49. 49.

    Interviews CSOs # 3, 7, 9, 10, 12

  50. 50.

    Interviews CSOs # 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 13

  51. 51.

    Interview CSO # 3

  52. 52.

    Interview CSO # 4

  53. 53.

    Interview CSO # 10

  54. 54.

    Interviews CSOs # 5, 13

  55. 55.

    Interview CSO # 6

  56. 56.

    Interview CSO # 4

  57. 57.

    Interview CSO # 12

  58. 58.

    Interview CSO # 6

  59. 59.

    Interview CSO # 12

  60. 60.

    Interviews CSOs # 2, 13

  61. 61.

    Interview CSO # 1

  62. 62.

    Interview MO # 26

  63. 63.

    e.g. CSO # 3

  64. 64.

    Interviews CSOs # 1, 5, 7

  65. 65.

    Interviews CSOs # 3, 5

  66. 66.

    www.eplo.org/assets/files/1.%20About%20us/Decision-making/EPLO_Internal_Statutes_1003XX.pdf, p. 3 (last accessed 9 February 2013)

  67. 67.

    Interviews CSOs # 4, 6, 8

  68. 68.

    Interview CSO # 12

  69. 69.

    Interviews CSOs # 4, 12

  70. 70.

    Interview CSO # 5

  71. 71.

    Interview CSO # 1, 11, 13

  72. 72.

    Interview CSO # 13

  73. 73.

    Interview CSO # 11

  74. 74.

    Interviews CSOs # 3, 6, 8, 10

  75. 75.

    Interview CSO # 12

  76. 76.

    Interview CSO # 10

  77. 77.

    Interview CSO # 3

  78. 78.

    Interview CSO # 12

  79. 79.

    Interview CSO # 6

  80. 80.

    Interviews CSOs # 4, 7, 12

  81. 81.

    Interview CSO # 4

  82. 82.

    Interview CSO # 7

  83. 83.

    Interview CSO # 12

  84. 84.

    Interview CSO # 6

  85. 85.

    Interview CSO # 10

  86. 86.

    Interview CSO # 3

  87. 87.

    Interview MO # 22

  88. 88.

    Interview MO # 21

  89. 89.

    They explained that if problems could not be solved at the level of the permanent delegates or policy committees (equivalent to working groups), they were referred to the executive committee, and eventually to the council of presidents as the highest decision-making body, where a vote could take place as the last resort.

  90. 90.

    Interview MO # 7

  91. 91.

    WIDE: steering committee; EPLO: steering committee as well as the general assembly at EPLO

  92. 92.

    http://eplo.org/decision-making-structures.html (last accessed 9 February 2013)

  93. 93.

    Interview MO # 23

  94. 94.

    Interview MO # 2

  95. 95.

    Interview MO # 8

  96. 96.

    E.g. interview MO # 10

  97. 97.

    Interview MO # 24

  98. 98.

    Interviews MOs # 7, 12, 22

  99. 99.

    Interview MO # 8

  100. 100.

    Interviews MOs # 4, 9

  101. 101.

    Interview MO # 16

  102. 102.

    Interview MO # 9

  103. 103.

    Interviews MOs # 1, 3, 5. The two remaining large federations were not available for an interview.

  104. 104.

    Interview MO # 19

  105. 105.

    Interview MO # 22

  106. 106.

    Interviews MOs # 6, 10, 11

  107. 107.

    Interview MO # 16

  108. 108.

    Interview MO # 18

  109. 109.

    The member organisation representatives wanting to give more autonomy to the Brussels office clearly identified themselves as being part of this camp during the interviews. Member organisations supposedly defending the opposite view could not be so easily recognised, although the interviews provided some hints. The struggles about staff competencies at EPLO apparently persist, in spite of the fact that a decision was made at the general assembly in 2007 to give more autonomy to the Brussels office, according to the EPLO officer interviewed in July 2007. This decision does not seem to have solved the problem, at least not until mid-2010, when the last interviews with EPLO member organisations were conducted.

  110. 110.

    Interview MO # 4

  111. 111.

    Interview MO # 27

  112. 112.

    Interview MO # 27

  113. 113.

    Interview MO # 26

  114. 114.

    Interview MO # 28

  115. 115.

    Interview MO # 2

  116. 116.

    One EPLO member simply stated that there was “not enough” information (Interview MO # 4).

  117. 117.

    Interviews MOs # 8, 10

  118. 118.

    Interview MO # 24

  119. 119.

    Interview MO # 16

  120. 120.

    Multiple answers possible

  121. 121.

    Interviews MOs # 1, 3, 7

  122. 122.

    Interview MO # 1

  123. 123.

    Interview MO # 19

  124. 124.

    Interview MO # 26

  125. 125.

    Interviews MOs # 11, 30

  126. 126.

    Interviews MOs # 14, 15, 17

  127. 127.

    Interview MO # 16

  128. 128.

    Interview MO # 4

  129. 129.

    Interviews MOs # 16, 21

  130. 130.

    Interview MO # 23

  131. 131.

    Interview MO # 21

  132. 132.

    Interviews MOs # 1, 3, 13, 20, 21, 29

  133. 133.

    Interview MO # 12

  134. 134.

    Interview MO # 19

  135. 135.

    Interview MO # 19

  136. 136.

    Interview MO # 22

  137. 137.

    Interview MO # 7

  138. 138.

    Interview MO # 8

  139. 139.

    Interview MO # 23

  140. 140.

    Interview MO # 9

  141. 141.

    Interview MOs # 19, 11

  142. 142.

    Interviews MOs # 15, 16

  143. 143.

    Interview MO # 17

  144. 144.

    Interview MO # 10

  145. 145.

    Interview MO # 4

  146. 146.

    Interviews MOs # 4, 24, 26, 27

  147. 147.

    Interview MO # 27

  148. 148.

    Interview MO # 24

  149. 149.

    Interview MO # 24

  150. 150.

    Interview MO # 26

  151. 151.

    Interview MO # 5

  152. 152.

    Interview MO # 28

  153. 153.

    Interview MO # 12

  154. 154.

    They are distributed across all three organisations: five BusinessEurope members, eight WIDE members, and five EPLO members.

  155. 155.

    Interview MO # 6

  156. 156.

    Interviews MOs # 5, 8, 15, 20

  157. 157.

    Interview MO # 8

  158. 158.

    Interview MO # 20

  159. 159.

    Interview MO # 27, see also interview MO # 8

  160. 160.

    Interviews MOs # 4, 21

  161. 161.

    Interview MO # 28, see also interview MO # 23

  162. 162.

    Interview MO # 16

  163. 163.

    Interview MO # 8

  164. 164.

    Interview MO # 9

  165. 165.

    Interview MO # 10

  166. 166.

    Interviews MOs # 4, 8, 11, 13, 14, 18

  167. 167.

    Interviews MOs # 2, 9, 15, 17, 25, 26

  168. 168.

    Interview MO # 9

  169. 169.

    Interview MO # 5

  170. 170.

    Interview MO # 11

  171. 171.

    Interview MO # 7. The organisation used to have an office in Brussels, but had to close it down during the economic crisis.

  172. 172.

    Interview MO # 22

  173. 173.

    Interview MO # 25

  174. 174.

    Interview MO # 26

  175. 175.

    Interview MO # 5

  176. 176.

    The figure includes affirmative answers only. The answers of interviewees who stated that the respective factors did not have an influence on how well their member organisation was represented do not appear in this diagram. The same is true for ambiguous answers: One respondent came up with arguments for and against being Brussels-based as an influencing factor of representation; another member organisation representative was uncertain whether or not the financial situation and the size played a role. Five answers were not provided.

  177. 177.

    Interview MO # 12.

  178. 178.

    Interview MO # 5

  179. 179.

    Interview MO # 19

  180. 180.

    Interview MO # 23

  181. 181.

    Interview MO # 28

  182. 182.

    For example, a member representative from a poorer EU member state explained: “Especially with the crisis in our land, it is not easy to take the plane just to participate at a working group which lasts three or four hours.” (Interview MO # 25).

  183. 183.

    Interview MO # 4

  184. 184.

    Interview MO # 5

  185. 185.

    Interview MO # 1 (author’s translation)

  186. 186.

    Interview MO # 19

  187. 187.

    This is in line with the statement of a large member representative who said that their organisation never tried to impose its view on the others and acted outside of the umbrella’s framework if the position deviated from the umbrella’s consensus position (Interview MO # 3).

  188. 188.

    Interviews MOs # 8, 9, 13, 25

  189. 189.

    Interview MO # 8

  190. 190.

    A BusinessEurope member argued, for example, that whether a member organisation could contribute a qualified position to a certain topic depended on the number of trained lawyers within its staff (Interview MO # 7, see also interviews MOs # 12, 19, 25).

  191. 191.

    Interview MO # 12

  192. 192.

    Interview MO # 5

  193. 193.

    Interview MO # 4

  194. 194.

    Interview MO # 6

  195. 195.

    In most CSOs of the sample, membership fees are staggered and member organisations with a greater budget contribute more than those with a smaller budget.

  196. 196.

    Interview MO # 21

  197. 197.

    Interviews MOs # 15, 19, 23. One interviewee explained that the thematic overlaps were due to the top-down creation of the member organisation, which had led to an outright adoption of the topics debated at the EU level (Interview MO # 29).

  198. 198.

    Interview MO # 23

  199. 199.

    Interviews MOs # 6, 8

  200. 200.

    Interview MO # 1

  201. 201.

    Interviews MOs # 4, 14, 26, 28 One member of BusinessEurope claimed to be more free trade-oriented (interview MO # 26) and another one reported that their federation was more progressive than the others (interview MO # 28).

  202. 202.

    Interview MO # 10

  203. 203.

    The respondent explained that members with historical ties took the lead on specific topics, such as the Italians and French with Mediterranean countries or the British member federation on transatlantic relations (interview MO # 4).

  204. 204.

    Interviews MOs # 6, 15

  205. 205.

    Interviews MOs # 17, 21, 28

  206. 206.

    Interviews MOs # 10, 12, 29

  207. 207.

    Interview MO # 12

  208. 208.

    Interview MO # 13

  209. 209.

    Interview MO # 26

  210. 210.

    Interviews MOs # 4, 20

  211. 211.

    Interview MO # 26

  212. 212.

    Interviews MOs # 4, 20, 26. As it takes time to build up relationships, the membership duration in the EU-level CSO also matters (interview MO # 29). Furthermore, being of the same nationality and speaking the same language as the EU office staff members was deemed helpful (interviews MOs # 5, 29).

  213. 213.

    Interview MO # 26

  214. 214.

    Interviews MOs # 23, 26, 27, 29. Respondents from UK-based member organisations explained that if their government was more engaged at the EU level, there would also be more lobbying and interest in the EU among UK-based organisations (interviews MOs # 11, 13). Two interviewees mentioned that good contacts with EU institution officials were helpful, since they made the member organisation valuable for the umbrella organisation (interviews MOs # 23, 28).

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Rodekamp, M. (2014). The Relational Dimension of CSO Representativeness – Assessing Accountability, Participation, and Satisfaction. In: Their Members’ Voice. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-02213-6_5

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