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Vetospieler und Institutionen

  • Steffen Ganghof
  • Kai Schulze
Chapter

Zusammenfassung

Der Beitrag führt in die Grundlagen und wesentlichen Entwicklungslinien der Vetospielertheorie sowie von Vetopunkt-Ansätzen ein. Anhand von Beispielen werden die Potentiale der Theorien und Ansätze für die Policy-Forschung diskutiert und worauf bei ihrer Rezeption und Anwendung zu achten ist. Bei der Diskussion der Vetospielertheorie unterscheiden wir zwischen der reinen Theorie und ihrer Anwendung sowie ihrem Test. In Bezug auf die Vetopunkt-Literatur unterscheiden wir einen eindimensionalen und einen zweidimensionalen Entwicklungspfad. In der Gesamtschau zeigt sich, dass die Vetospielertheorie und Vetopunkt-Ansätze wichtige Beiträge zur Policy-Forschung liefern, aber aufgrund strittiger Annahmen keine umfassenden und einfachen Analyseansätze bereithalten.

Keywords:

Policy-Forschung, Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft; Institutionen; Vetospieler; Vetopunkte. 

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universität PotsdamWirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universitätskomplex IIIPotsdamDeutschland

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