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Umfragen, Wählererwartungen und strategisches Wählen: ein deutsch-britischer Vergleich

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Zusammenfassung

"Duvergers Gesetz" ist vielleicht eine der bekanntesten, aber daher auch umstrittensten Regelmäßigkeiten, die für repräsentative Demokratien festgestellt, behauptet oder diskutiert wurden. Gemäß dieses "Gesetzes" tendieren Mehrheitswahlsysteme dazu, Zweiparteiensysteme hervorzubringen, während Mehrparteiensysteme nur dann entstehen und bestehen können, wenn das Wahlsystem nach den Prinzipien der proportionalen Repräsentation funktioniert (Duverger 1965, 1972).

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Elff, M., Kosmidis, S. (2013). Umfragen, Wählererwartungen und strategisches Wählen: ein deutsch-britischer Vergleich. In: Weßels, B., Schoen, H., Gabriel, O. (eds) Wahlen und Wähler. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-01328-8_24

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-01328-8_24

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