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Führungskräftevergütung

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Correspondence to Anja Tuschke Prof. Dr. .

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Tuschke, A. (2013). Führungskräftevergütung. In: Stock-Homburg, R. (eds) Handbuch Strategisches Personalmanagement. Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-00431-6_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-00431-6_17

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