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Tuschke, A. (2013). Führungskräftevergütung. In: Stock-Homburg, R. (eds) Handbuch Strategisches Personalmanagement. Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-00431-6_17
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