Abstract
Since a couple of years central bank independence is a very popular topic in economic literature as well as in the political discussion. There are several reasons for this actual interest:
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the different proposals concerning the institutional status of the European Central Bank (ECB) as a part of the European Monetary Union (EMU) during the time the Maastricht Treaty was prepared;
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the critical analysis and the political discussion of the specific regulations of the treaty itself concerning the status of the ECB;
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the necessity of reforming the banking system and to establish a new central bank law in post-socialist countries in accordance with the transformation of the economic system.
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Kath, D. (1998). Central Bank Autonomy and Political Decision Process. In: Wagner, H. (eds) Current Issues in Monetary Economics. Contributions to Economics. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-99797-6_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-99797-6_5
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