Abstract
The question how monetary institutions should be designed attracted considerable attention during the past years. In the context of the Maastricht Treaty, there has been a surge of papers on the adequate design of the European Central Bank; the breakdown of the Rouble-zone created a strong demand for policy advice about what kind of monetary institutions should be adapted in Eastern European countries; finally, after the breakdown of stability of money demand in many countries, there was a need to redesign monetary policy instruments.
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© 1998 Physica-Verlag Heidelberg
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Illing, G. (1998). Mechanism Design for Central Banks — Results and Unsolved Issues. In: Wagner, H. (eds) Current Issues in Monetary Economics. Contributions to Economics. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-99797-6_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-99797-6_3
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