Abstract
A multi-stage inspector’s game is treated in which the inspector can prevent the aggressor from a gain by an aggressive action if he has sufficient means for inspections. He obtains the means in a random process with distribution R. The question is solved for which R the inspector can prevent the aggressor from a gain by an aggression.
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Literatur
Dresher, M.: A Sampling Inspection Problem in Arms Control Agreements: A Game-Theoretic Analysis. RAND Corp: RM -2972 - ARPA 1962
Bierlein, D.: Auf Bilanzen und Inventuren basierende Überwachungssysteme Operations Research Verfahren VIII (1970), p. 36 - 43
Höpfinger, E.: Reliable Inspectionsstrategies (erscheint in Mathematical Systems in Economics. Verlag Anton Hain).
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© 1974 Physica-Verlag, Rudolf Liebing KG, Würzburg
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Höpfinger, E. (1974). Zuverlässige Inspektionsstrategien. In: Gessner, P., Henn, R., Steinecke, V., Todt, H. (eds) DGOR Papers of the Annual Meeting 1973 / Vorträge der Jahrestagung 1973. Proceedings in Operations Research, vol 1973. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-99747-1_25
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-99747-1_25
Publisher Name: Physica-Verlag HD
Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-0138-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-99747-1
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