Abstract
Almost every student who wants to become familiar with Quine’s philosophical positions will soon run into trouble. Those theses of Quine’s which belong to philosophy of science seem to be very general and very abstract. It is often not quite clear how they are to be established and sometimes not even what their precise content amounts to. Some readers of Quine’s works resign themselves to the position that Quine’s philosophy is basically philosophy of logic and of language and that his philosophy of science is of secondary importance.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1979 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Stegmüller, W. (1979). Holism, Underdetermination of Theories and Research Programmes: Remarks on W. V. Quine and I. Lakatos. In: The Structuralist View of Theories. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-95360-6_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-95360-6_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-09460-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-95360-6
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive