Computer Simulation of Social Value Orientation: Vitality, Satisfaction, and Emergent Game Structures

Abstract

We examined dyadic interaction among eight archetypal social value orientations, or SVOs. (McClintock, 1978). These 8 SVOs differ in terms of two value systems: (1) concern with the well being of others and (2) concern with the well being of self (+,0 for Altruism; +,+ for Cooperation; 0,+ for Individualism; -,+ for Competition; -,0 for Aggression; -,- for Sadomasochism; 0,- for Masochism; and +,- for Martyrdom). All different pairs of SVOs (n=36) were formed, and each dyad played 60,000 2x2 games. For each game, the 2 payoffs in each cell of the matrix were generated randomly so that games had no particular structure (i.e., Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, etc), or symmetry. The decision process was based 0on Kelley and Thibaut’s (1978) notion of transforming the given matrix into the effective matrix. That is, each SVO transformed the pair of given payoffs in each cell to a single number, or effective payoff (utility) based on its SVO (e.g., Cooperators took the sum of the payoffs to self and other; Altruists only considered the payoffs to the partner; Competitors subtracted the other’s points from their own). Next, each SVO chose the row or column with the largest average utility. We examined the long term outcomes of each SVO in two ways: (1) accumulated given points referred to as vitality, and (2) accumulated effective points (utilities) referred to as satisfaction. Vitality was completely determined by two things: (1) player’s concern with its own (given) outcomes, and (2) partner’s concern with player’s (given) outcomes. Although Individualism was the most vital SVO at the single person level, at the dyadic level, pairs of Cooperators were more vital than pairs of Individualists. For Satisfaction, no SVO did best overall. Satisfaction depended completely on the particular SVO pairing. The strongest mutual satisfaction was achieved by SVO pairs with identical effective matrices (e.g., Cooperator/Cooperator, Individualist/Altruist). Emergent Games: We also examined the long-term payoff matrices (the average of given points over 60,000 trials) produced by the pairings of different SVOs. A variety of such Emergent Games occurred, and the structure of each was tied perfectly to the SVO pair that formed it. Thus, the origins of structures are rooted in the social value systems of the involved parties. Notably, the Emergent Game produced by Cooperation versus Individualism is a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma.