An Interactionist’s View of System Pathology

  • James Reason
Part of the NATO ASI Series book series (volume 32)


This paper argue that serious failures of a complex, centralized system arise from the interaction between two factors:
  • • The properties of the system as a whole (the systems domain).

  • • The information-handling characteristics of the human element (the human domain).


Nuclear Power Plant Prospective Memory Omission Error Confirmation Bias Pressurize Water Reactor 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1987

Authors and Affiliations

  • James Reason
    • 1
  1. 1.University of ManchesterManchesterUK

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