On Concepts for Solving Two-Person Games Which Model the Verification Problem in Arms Control

  • J. Fichtner
Part of the NATO ASI Series book series (volume 26)


Arms control agreements which include non-trivial verification procedures whose details are accessible to the general public are of special interest to the mathematically oriented analyst. This is typically the case with multilateral treaties under which verification is often performed by an international agency or by supranational commissions or institutions. Bilateral agreements often rely on national technical means or intelligence services. It is therefore extremely difficult to get sufficiently detailed information on these treaties as inputs to mathematical modelling.


False Alarm Solution Concept Matrix Game Sequential Game Verification Problem 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • J. Fichtner
    • 1
  1. 1.Federal Armed Forces University MunichFederal Republic of Germany

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