General Ordinal 2×2 Games in Arms Control Applications

  • Niall M. Fraser
Conference paper
Part of the NATO ASI Series book series (volume 26)


The most common model of human behavior employed in game theory is the normal form, introduced by von NEUMANN and MORGENSTERN (1953). An example of a two player, two strategy game (“2×2 game”) in normal form is illustrated in Table 1. This particular game is called “Prisoners’ Dilemma”. The possible outcomes are the four cells of the matrix. Player 1 must choose between row R1 and row R2, while player 2 must choose between column C1 and column C2. If Player 1 chooses R1 while 2 chooses CI, the resulting outcome is the upper left cell of the matrix, which, in Prisoners’ Dilemma, is marked 3,3. The numbers in each cell (called “payoffs”) denote the relative preference of each player for the outcome; the first number is for Player 1 and the second for Player 2. The higher the number, the more preferred the outcome. Thus, the most preferred outcome for Player 1 is represented by the (R2, C1) cell, which is marked 4,1. This is Player 2’s least preferred outcome.


Nash Equilibrium Normal Form Solution Concept Prefer Outcome Stability Concept 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • Niall M. Fraser
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Management SciencesUniversity of WaterlooWaterlooCanada

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