Mobility, Diversification, and Sustainability of Trade Reform
The discussion of the benefits of free trade is almost as old as the economics profession itself. Countries that have achieved free trade through policy reform almost inevitably succumb to protectionist policies after a period of free trade. Despite numerous successful initiatives for trade reform, interest groups seek and often eventually achieve protection. The trend toward increased protectionism continues until the economy-wide need for reform is sufficient to motivate a successful initiative for reform. The Uruguay round of negotiations of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) represents a significant initiative in potential multilateral economic reform. The fact that it is the fourth round of negotiations for GATT is an indication of the difficulty in achieving reform which is sustainable.
KeywordsIncome Assure Expense Dition Nash
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Bhagwati JN (1971) The generalized theory of trade and welfare. In: Bhagwati JN, Jones RW, Mundell RA, Vanek J (eds) Trade, balance of payments and growth. North Holland, AmsterdamGoogle Scholar
- Corden WM (1969) Effective protection rates in the general equilibrium Model. Oxford Econ Pap 21:135–141Google Scholar
- Heckscher E (1949) The effect of foreign trade on the distribution of income. In: Ellis HS, Metzler LA (eds) Readings in the theory of international trade. Blackiston, PhiladelphiaGoogle Scholar
- Krueger AO (1974) The political economy of rent seeking. Am Econ Rev 64:291–303Google Scholar
- Lipsey RG, Lancaster K (1957) The general theory of “second best.” Rev Econ Stud 24:11–32Google Scholar
- Mayer W (1984) Endogenous tariff formation. Am Econ Rev 74:970–985Google Scholar
- Meade JE (1955) Trade and welfare. Oxford University Press, LondonGoogle Scholar
- Rausser GC, Foster WE (1990) Political preference functions and public policy reform. Am J Agric Econ 72:642–652Google Scholar
- Staiger RW, Tabellini G (1987) Discretionary trade policy and excessive protection. Am Econ Rev 77:823–837Google Scholar
- Tullock G (1967) The welfare cost of tariffs, monopolies, and theft. West Econ J 5:224–232Google Scholar
- Viner J (1950) The customs unions issue. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New YorkGoogle Scholar