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Social Dilemmas and Cooperation pp 147–171Cite as

Provision of step-level public goods: Effects of different information structures

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Abstract

We report the results of two experiments on social dilemmas in which each of n players receives an endowment and then decides privately whether to contribute it for the provision of a monetary public good. The good is provided if and only if at least m group members contribute. Decisions are made sequentially. We present and then test an equilibrium model under two different information conditions in which players are informed of 1) the previous decisions in the sequence; 2) either the number of previous contributions or the number of previous non-contributions. When the equilibrium solution yields unique predictions, most of the subjects behaved in accordance with it.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Management and Policy, University of Arizona, Tucson, USA

    Amnon Rapoport

  2. Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel

    Ido Erev

Authors
  1. Amnon Rapoport
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  2. Ido Erev
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Abteilung für Psychologie, Universität Bielefeld, Postfach 100131, D-33501, Bielefeld, Germany

    Ulrich Schulz

  2. Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universität Bielefeld, Postfach 100131, D-33501, Bielefeld, Germany

    Wulf Albers

  3. ZUMA, Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen, Postfach 122155, D-68072, Mannheim, Germany

    Ulrich Mueller

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© 1984 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg

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Rapoport, A., Erev, I. (1984). Provision of step-level public goods: Effects of different information structures. In: Schulz, U., Albers, W., Mueller, U. (eds) Social Dilemmas and Cooperation. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-78860-4_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-78860-4_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-78862-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-78860-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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