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Resistance against mass immigration - An evolutionary explanation

  • Werner Güth
  • Klaus Ritzberger
Conference paper

Abstract

In Europe we face very different living standards in different countries. In former times such discrepancies did not induce mass migration since mobility was restricted, especially between Eastern and Western European countries. But now the relatively richer countries are confronted with mass immigration and also strong resistance against it. We will show that resistance against mass immigration can be explained as being genetically determined. Specifically, we will analyse a very simple game model of immigration with an undetermined preference parameter deciding whether an incumbent engages into opposition against mass immigration or not. It is shown that preference for fighting against mass immigration is the only evolutionarily stable strategy for all possible parameter constellations. In our view this has important political implications regardless whether one wants to argue for a more liberal immigration law or against it.

Keywords

Reproductive Success Living Condition Preference Parameter Evolutionary Game Western European Country 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg 1984

Authors and Affiliations

  • Werner Güth
    • 1
  • Klaus Ritzberger
    • 2
  1. 1.FB WirtschaftswissenschaftenJohann Wolfgang Goethe-UniversitätFrankfurt am MainGermany
  2. 2.Dept. of EconomicsInstitute for Advanced StudiesViennaAustria

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