Abstract
A growing tradition in analysing bargaining behaviour uses an experimental setup to provide tools for controlling parameters of the underlying conflict. Game theory is used to provide a model of the conflict, to analyse the possible actions of the agents and the arguments that might be used within the bargaining process and to understand the results of the bargaining. In face-to-face bargaining, we usually find a great variety of actions that are not explainable and sometimes not even compatible with the usual rationality-assumptions on the agents. It is widely accepted that bounded rationality approaches are more adequate especially for the face-to-face settings. But it has not been really examined what concepts should be used in the corresponding models, and what tools are adequate for testing them. After a previous report on the use of the concept “social field” (Ostmann, 1992a), and another on a first attempt to explain bargaining results by aspirations and the social field (Ostmann, 1992b), this paper deals with aspiration processing in a more detailed way. We shall be exploring the limits of the concept “aspiration” with respect to explaining or predicting face-to-face bargaining processes.
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Ostmann, A. (1984). Aspiration processing in multilateral bargaining: Experiment, theory and simulation. In: Schulz, U., Albers, W., Mueller, U. (eds) Social Dilemmas and Cooperation. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-78860-4_23
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-78860-4_23
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