Cooperation in an asymmetric volunteer’s dilemma game Theory and experimental evidence

Abstract

The symmetric Volunteer’s dilemma game (VOD) models a situation in which each of N actors faces the decision of either producing a step-level collective good (action “C”) or freeriding (“D”). One player’s cooperative action suffices for producing the collective good. Unilateral cooperation yields a payoff U for D-players and U - K for the cooperative player(s). However, if all actors decide for “freeriding”, each player’s payoff is zero (U > K > 0). In this article, an essential modification is discussed. In an asymmetric VOD, the interest in the collective good and/or the production costs (i.e. work) may vary between actors. The generalized asymmetric VOD is similar to market entry games. Alternative hypotheses abaout the behavior of subjects are derived from a game-theoretical analysis. They are investigated in an experimental setting. The application of the mixed Nash-equilibrium concept yields a rather counter-intuitive prediction which apparently contradicts the empirical data. The predictions of the Harsanyi-Selten-theory and Schelling’s “focal point theory” are in better accordance with the data. However, they do not account for the “diffusion-of-responsibility-effect” also observable in the context of an asymmetric VOD game.