Skip to main content

The Ecological Disaster of Bitterfeld and Chicken Games

  • Chapter
  • 216 Accesses

Abstract

Environmental contamination is one limiting factor for privatization of the formerly state owned companies in the eastern part of Germany. The negotiations between the Treuhandanstalt (German Trusteeship Agency) and prospective investors are game-theoretically modelled. It is argued that the prisoner dilemma game is not appropriate to model the environmental contamination as a public good provision problem. The application of the Chicken game leads to more realistic results. Furthermore, the political implications of this situation are analysed.

We thank U. Blum and J. Mönius for helpful comments.

Keywords

  • Nash Equilibrium
  • Public Choice
  • German Democratic Republic
  • Future Investor
  • Ecological Hazard

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Kreps, D. (1990), Game Theory and Economic Modelling, Clarendon, Oxford.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Lipnowski, I. and Maital, S. (1983), “Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good as the Game of ‘Chicken’,” Journal of Public Economics 20, 381–386.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Mueller, D. (1989), Public choice — A revised edition of Public choice, Cambridge, New York et al.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sachverständigenrat (1992), Jahresgutachten1991(S)1992 des Sachverstandigenrates zur Beurteilung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Bonn, BT-Drucksache 12(S)1618.

    Google Scholar 

  • Städtebau, Institut für (1992), quoted in: Wirtschaftswoche 46, Supplement, No. 13, 3–5.

    Google Scholar 

  • Taylor, M. and Ward, H. (1982), “Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy Goods: Alternative Models of Public-Goods Provision,” Political Studies 30, No. 3, 350–370.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Ward, H. (1987), “The Risks of a Reputation for Toughness: Strategy in Public Goods Provision — Problems Modelled by Chicken Supergames,” British Journal of Political Science 17, 23–52.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

Copyright information

© 1993 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Morlok, J., Siegmund, J. (1993). The Ecological Disaster of Bitterfeld and Chicken Games. In: Diewert, W.E., Spremann, K., Stehling, F. (eds) Mathematical Modelling in Economics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-78508-5_44

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-78508-5_44

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-78510-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-78508-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive