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Constituent-Sensitive Public Fund Sharing

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The member states of a federation usually have to share their revenues. They are supported by additional grants from the central government. It is controversial, however, how the states’ shares of public funds should be determined. We modify an earlier axiomatic approach to this problem. In particular we allow for state-specific equalization functions. It turns out, among others, that now different lump sum payments to the states may be made which, across the federation, must add up to zero.


  • Public Fund
  • Cost Allocation
  • Federal Grant
  • Equalization Coefficient
  • Final Fund

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This research has been supported in part by a Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada grant.

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© 1993 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg

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Aczél, J., Pfingsten, A. (1993). Constituent-Sensitive Public Fund Sharing. In: Diewert, W.E., Spremann, K., Stehling, F. (eds) Mathematical Modelling in Economics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-78510-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-78508-5

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